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Minimum-Income Benefits in OECD Countries: 
Policy Design, Effectiveness and Challenges 
 
Almost all OECD countries operate comprehensive minimum-income programmes for 
working-age individuals, either as last-resort safety nets alongside primary income 
replacement benefits, or as the principal instrument for delivering social protection. Such 
safety-net benefits aim primarily at providing an acceptable standard of living for families 
unable to earn sufficient incomes from other sources. This paper provides an overview of 
social assistance and other minimum-income programmes in OECD countries, summarises 
their main features, and highlights a number of current policy challenges. 
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The current economic downturn is putting pressures on governments to strengthen income 
support measures. While buoyant labour markets in many OECD countries have helped to 
restrain recipiency numbers since the mid-late nineties, the current rapid decline in economic 
activity can be expected to be a powerful driver of the demand for minimum safety-nets. 
 
In addition to the expected lengthening of average unemployment spells, and the resulting 
rising number of people running out of unemployment benefit entitlements, those with 
temporary jobs or other forms of non-standard employment are often not entitled to 
unemployment benefits in the first place. For these individuals, employment durations are 
shorter, transitions into and out of work more frequent and coverage by social insurance 
benefits can be less universal as a result. They are also typically more easily shed from the 
workforce. With increasing shares of non-standard workers in a number of OECD countries, 
this may cause social assistance benefit rolls to react more strongly to labour-market 
conditions (i.e., become more counter-cyclical) than was the case in the past. In the medium 
term, some of these challenges point to the need for a debate on the relative roles of 
insurance and assistance benefits. For instance, should coverage of insurance benefits be 
extended to non-standard workers or should lower-tier assistance benefits be strengthened? 
 
More urgently, there is a need to consider how an activation and reintegration focus can be 
maintained when labour demand is weak and competition for existing job vacancies intense 
(OECD, 2009b, c). Where minimum-income programmes are lower-tier benefits, recipients 
tend to face significantly less promising employment prospects in a slack labour market than 
recipients of unemployment benefits with more recent work experience. Yet, the group of 
minimum-income beneficiaries is very heterogeneous in most countries including, for 
instance, those with recent but intermittent employment records and other recent job losers 
who do not qualify for insurance benefits. Increasing numbers of benefit recipients are likely 
to test the capacity of welfare agencies and public employment services to administer high-
quality activation programmes and job-search assistance to everybody. This will further add 
to the challenge of targeting activation and support measures in a way that minimises benefit 
spells for the most employable, while preventing less employable clients from becoming 
permanently benefit-dependent.  
 
The most immediate priority, however, is to prevent support seekers from going without 
effective minimum safety-nets at a time when they are most needed. Preventing steep 
increases in the extent and severity of poverty is likely to present a particularly difficult short-
term challenge for those countries that are not currently operating broad minimum-income 
programmes. In addition, existing social assistance programmes are likely to see new clients 
added at much faster rates as unemployment durations lengthen. They will only be able to 
continue meeting their objectives of poverty alleviation and activation if they are equipped 
with the financial and operational capacity to deal with the inflow of new claimants and an 
increasing stock of recipients.    
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Almost all OECD countries operate comprehensive minimum-income programmes for working-age 
individuals and their families, either as last-resort safety nets alongside primary income replacement 
benefits, or as the principal instrument for delivering social protection. These safety-net benefits aim at 
providing an acceptable standard of living for families unable to earn sufficient incomes from other 
sources. As anti-poverty measures, they reduce income disparities at the bottom of the income spectrum 
and, as such, represent important building blocks of redistribution policies. Equally important, they act as 
safety nets for individuals experiencing low-income spells and, hence, help to smooth income levels over 
time. 
This paper provides a broad overview of contemporary minimum-income transfers in OECD 
countries.
2 In the policy debate, as well as in economic models, such transfers are occasionally 
characterised as simple income floors. Yet, while benefit levels are important, the extent to which they 
shape distributional outcomes depends on a multitude of other factors. To appreciate country differences in 
the role of minimum-income benefits, and in the situation of benefit recipients, it is necessary to look at a 
range of policy parameters in combination. 
One important factor is the way in which benefits of last resort are embedded in the wider social 
policy framework. For example, their significance as a redistribution instrument evidently differs between 
countries where they complement other benefits that provide powerful first-tier safety nets (as in much of 
continental Europe) and those where they represent the main benefit (as in Australia, New Zealand). 
Consequently, reforms of higher-tier benefits will often have implications for minimum-income 
programmes in terms of spending levels, the number and characteristics of benefit recipients, as well as 
optimal strategies for supporting them. 
Since the 1990’s, social policy debates in OECD countries have increasingly emphasised the need for 
“active” and “activating” support. Although the balance varies very much between countries and policy 
areas, such support includes assistance for those making efforts towards regaining self-sufficiency, allied to 
the possibility of benefit sanctions if a client’s own efforts are considered inadequate. Attempts to 
rebalance policies from passive income assistance towards strengthening self-sufficiency have, at least in 
principle, been a central element of reform initiatives across a broad range of social policy areas. The 
successes of such efforts have nevertheless been uneven. While those who are, in some sense, closest to the 
labour market are in a good position to benefit from work-oriented support, achieving lasting labour 
market integration and adequate incomes has proved much more difficult for other social policy clients, 
including recipients of social assistance and other benefits of last resort. 
                                                      
1 .  I wish to thank delegates to the OECD Working Party on Social Policy for providing responses to policy 
questionnaires. I also thank Jonathan Bradshaw for helpful comments and Sebastian Königs for 
outstanding research assistance. Any remaining errors and views expressed in this paper are my 
responsibility. In particular, the paper does not represent the views of the OECD or the Governments of 
OECD member countries. 
2  .  Much more comprehensive earlier reviews of social assistance policies in different countries include 
Eardley et al. (1996), OECD (1998a; 1998b; 1999) as well as Adema et al. (2003). In-depth information 
on, and analyses of, policies in individual countries is available in the OECD’s Benefits and Wages series 
which includes information on policy institutions and parameters, as well as indicators on income adequacy 
and work incentives (www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives). Activation policies are the subject of on-
going OECD policy reviews and other analytical work (see www.oecd.org/els/employment/almp).    
  5
The question of how to maintain active social policies in a context of weak labour markets, as 
experienced during the current economic crisis, brings renewed momentum to this debate. 
The paper starts out by proposing a simple typology for situating different types of minimum-income 
benefits as elements of the overall redistribution system. Section 3 summarises the generosity of benefit 
payments and summarises the structure of health-care-related support measures that complement cash 
benefit payments. Section 4 describes the limited available comparative data on the number of benefit 
claimants and considers to what extent they matter when assessing the relevance of social assistance 
measures as safety nets. Section 5 provides a condensed overview of the “mutual obligations” debate 
discussing, in turn, the rationale of back-to-work and other activation measures, the different approaches 
used in different countries, and the main results from the evaluation literature. Section 6 illustrates some 
institutional and implementation aspects of administering benefit payments and re-integration services. The 
last section concludes by highlighting some challenges for minimum-income programmes posed by the 
current economic downturn. 
2.  A typology of minimum-income benefits: scope and links with other transfer programmes 
Benefits of last resort mean different things in different countries and for different population groups. 
For the purpose of this paper, they are defined as cash or in-kind transfers that aim at preventing extreme 
hardship and employ a low-income criterion as the central entitlement condition. Benefits of last resort 
therefore include social assistance benefits as well as other means-tested assistance payments that are 
typically received by families with no other income sources (although, as discussed below, the same 
benefits can to some extent also top up the incomes of low-paid workers and other low-income groups). 
Examples are means-tested lone-parent benefits, as well as unemployment assistance benefits that are not 
conditional on work or contribution histories (as in Australia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, New Zealand, 
UK). The terminology used to describe benefits of last resort varies across countries. In what follows, 
‘social assistance’ is used to refer to minimum-income benefits that are generally available and, thus, not 
targeted to specific population groups. ‘Minimum-income benefit’ is a broader concept that includes social 
assistance but also other, more targeted, programmes with a similar function (e.g., means-tested lone-
parent benefits). I use the terms ‘minimum-income benefit‘, ‘minimum safety-net benefits’, ‘welfare 
benefits’ and ‘last-resort benefits’ synonymously. To focus the discussion, this paper is limited to benefits 
targeted at able-bodied working-age individuals and their families.
3 
In most areas of social spending, overall expenditure data are a good starting point for appreciating 
country variations in terms of the significance of policies that address different contingencies. The 
variation of spending patterns across countries is illustrated in Table 1 using recent social expenditure data 
compiled by the OECD. The columns on the right show breakdowns of total public spending across nine 
social policy domains, while the first three columns report total spending levels as well as spending on 
cash benefits and on income-tested programmes. It is apparent that targeting low-income groups is a 
central design feature of cash transfer programmes in several OECD countries including the UK, Ireland, 
                                                      
3.  Depending on the structure of support available for individuals with health problems as well as (early) 
retirees, these groups may fall into the scope of broadly-defined minimum-income programmes. At the 
same time, very large numbers of recipients of disability or early-retirement benefits in several OECD 
countries illustrate that these benefits can end up being used for contingencies for which they were not 
designed (such as long-term unemployment). The particular issues that are pertinent for these two groups 
are outside the scope of this paper. Issues related specifically to benefit claimants with disabilities or other 
health-related problems are discussed in the OECD series Sickness, Disability and Work (see 
www.oecd.org/els/disability). Pension policies, including means-tested, basic and minimum pensions, are 
discussed in Pensions at a Glance (www.oecd.org/els/social/pag). The latest issue in this series contains a 
chapter on poverty among old-age individuals (OECD, 2009a). Finally, employment barriers for older 
workers have been the subject of in-depth country reviews (www.oecd.org/olderworkersforum).   6
New Zealand, Canada and, most notably, Australia. In countries with extensive social insurance benefits, 
the budgetary relevance of means-tested transfers is correspondingly lower. 





















Australia 17.1 8.1 6.3 26.0 1.2 14.2 34.3 16.5 2.2 3.2 1.5 0.8
Austria 27.2 18.4 1.1 46.5 1.3 8.8 25.1 10.4 2.3 4.2 0.4 1.1
Belgium 26.4 16.2 0.9 27.2 7.7 8.9 27.8 9.9 4.1 12.6 0.3 1.7
Canada 16.5 6.8 3.3 22.6 2.4 5.6 41.5 6.4 1.8 3.8 2.7 13.3
Czech Republic 19.5 11.4 1.6 38.3 0.9 12.4 32.4 8.9 1.3 3.2 0.4 2.3
Denmark 27.1 13.6 1.0 26.8 0.0 15.9 21.6 12.5 6.5 10.4 2.6 3.7
Finland 26.1 15.3 2.6 32.6 3.4 14.7 23.8 11.4 3.4 7.7 1.1 1.9
France 29.2 17.5 1.9 37.4 6.1 6.3 26.9 10.3 3.1 5.9 2.8 1.2
Germany 26.7 15.9 1.5 42.0 1.4 7.0 28.7 8.1 3.6 6.2 2.3 0.8
Greece 20.5 13.4 1.3 52.5 3.9 4.4 27.4 5.3 0.3 1.9 2.5 1.8
Hungary 22.5 13.6 0.6 39.2 1.2 12.5 26.6 13.8 1.3 2.5 2.3 0.7
Iceland 16.9 5.7 1.0 22.6 0.2 15.9 37.4 17.6 0.5 1.8 1.2 2.9
Ireland 16.7 8.4 2.6 17.3 5.0 9.7 38.8 14.9 3.8 5.4 3.1 2.1
Italy 25.0 16.7 0.7 46.4 9.9 6.8 27.3 5.2 2.3 2.0 0.1 0.1
Japan 18.6 10.2 0.5 46.4 6.9 3.8 34.0 4.4 1.4 1.8 1.4
Korea 6.9 2.9 0.7 22.3 3.6 8.2 46.2 4.0 1.9 3.1 10.7
Luxembourg 23.2 13.9 0.5 22.6 8.7 14.1 30.1 15.5 2.2 4.2 0.7 1.9
Mexico 7.4 2.5 0.5 13.8 4.0 0.9 39.2 13.5 0.3 14.9 13.4
Netherlands 20.9 11.1 1.1 26.5 1.4 17.3 28.5 7.9 6.4 7.3 1.6 3.0
New Zealand 18.5 9.7 3.4 22.8 0.8 15.5 37.2 14.2 2.1 2.4 4.3 0.8
Norway 21.6 10.9 1.1 29.2 1.3 20.3 26.7 13.1 3.4 2.5 0.7 2.8
Poland 21.0 15.7 1.1 49.7 4.8 12.8 20.5 5.4 2.0 2.6 0.6 1.7
Portugal 22.9 13.9 1.7 36.3 6.6 10.5 31.0 6.5 2.9 4.7 0.0 1.4
Slovak Republic 16.6 10.2 0.6 37.3 1.3 10.1 31.9 12.8 2.1 1.6 0.0 3.0
Spain 21.2 13.1 1.6 37.1 2.6 11.7 27.5 5.4 3.6 10.4 0.8 0.9
Sweden 29.4 14.5 0.6 32.6 2.1 19.0 23.0 10.9 4.4 4.1 1.8 2.0
Switzerland 20.3 11.8 1.1 32.7 1.8 16.3 29.9 6.6 3.7 4.6 0.8 3.7
Turkey 13.7 8.1 0.5 46.7 11.5 1.5 39.6 0.2 0.0 0.4
United Kingdom 21.3 10.3 2.7 28.6 0.9 11.2 32.9 15.0 2.5 1.2 6.8 0.9
United States 15.9 8.0 1.2 33.3 4.8 8.1 43.7 3.9 0.8 1.9 3.6
OECD - Total 20.6 11.6 1.5 33.2 3.6 10.8 31.4 9.7 2.5 4.3 2.2 2.9
in % of total spending in % of GDP
1.  Data are before tax and account neither for the tax treatment of social benefits nor for tax expenditure (such as tax deductions for 
children), although tax credits that are paid in cash are included. The OECD also calculates net spending data which address these 
issues (see link in the sources). 
2.  Blank entries indicate that data are not available. Data for Portugal are for 2003. The following income-tested spending items are 
included in the ‘income-tested’ category: spending on “other contingencies - other social policy areas”, income-tested spending on the 
unemployed (e.g. unemployment assistance payments for Germany), income-tested support payments to elderly and disabled (e.g. 
Belgium, and the UK), other income tested payments (family cash transfers) but do not include specific housing subsidies, spending 
on Active Labour Market Policies, or income-tested medical support. 
Source: extraction from the preliminary 2005 wave of the OECD Social Expenditure Database (www.oecd.org/els/social/expenditure). 
However, for a number of reasons, these numbers are likely to portray a distorted picture of spending 
on minimum-income benefits as defined above. First, programme-level spending data is not always 
available and the decision whether or not to count broader benefit categories as means-tested can therefore 
be ambiguous. For the same reason, it is not straightforward to exclude programmes that employ means 
testing but are not in fact minimum-income benefits (examples are unemployment assistance that depends 
on previous work status and/or contribution payments, or family benefits which are withdrawn only at 
medium to high income levels). Second, data quality for the main social assistance benefits is generally    
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lower than for other spending categories.
4 Finally, aggregate spending data cannot be broken down by age 
group and expenditures for the working-age population are therefore not available. 
Because of these limitations, a more detailed look at institutional policy parameters is useful in order 
to assess the roles minimum-income benefits play in different countries. Similar measures can have very 
different effects depending on the institutional context in which they are used. In general, it is difficult to 
draw conclusions from looking at isolated measures without considering the full policy package affecting 
incomes and employment incentives. Table  2 lists the most important cash transfers available to the 
working-age group using a functional classification.
5 
Unemployment benefits are the main support measures for job losers and other individuals without 
employment.  Unemployment insurance programmes exist in most OECD countries and offer 
compensation for lost earnings subject to work-related conditions. Reflecting insurance principles, 
claimants must have contributed to the insurance fund or have been employed over certain periods in order 
to be eligible. Claimants must also be actively looking for work and, in most cases, unemployment has to 
be involuntary. Benefit durations are limited in most, but not all, countries. Insurance is mandatory for 
most employees, but voluntary in some Nordic countries. 
Job searchers whose entitlement to unemployment insurance benefits has expired, or whose work 
record is insufficient to make them eligible in the first place, may be entitled to unemployment assistance. 
In some countries, unemployment assistance is the main unemployment benefit. Eligibility is often, but not 
always, conditional on previous employment. As unemployment benefits, they are only available to those 
who are available and actively looking for work. Benefit durations may or may not be limited. While both 
insurance and assistance benefit schemes are typically (but, again, not universally) financed by 
contributions to unemployment insurance funds, the main purpose of assistance benefits is the provision of 
a minimum level of resources during unemployment rather than the insurance against lost earnings. As a 
result, benefit levels tend to be lower and less directly dependent on previous earnings. They are reduced if 
other incomes are available although means-testing tends to be less comprehensive than for social 
assistance benefits. 
 
                                                      
4 .  For instance, the distinction between cash, near-cash and in-kind benefits can be problematic and certain 
components may not be properly recorded (e.g. special payments in exceptional circumstances or other 
discretionary payments, such as re-employment support). Also, the decentralised delivery of minimum-
income benefits can lead to incomplete reporting, or non-reporting, of spending by local authorities to 
central government. Importantly, non-categorical social assistance, which is the main last-resort benefit in 
most countries, is recorded under the “other social policy areas” heading, which may lead some countries 
to treat it a residual category when reporting these data. 
5  .  Further details on eligibility and entitlement conditions for each programme are given on 
www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives (using the link “tables summarizing tax-benefit policy features”).  
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Table 2.  Main cash benefits for able-bodied working-age individuals and their families, 2007 
Insurance Assistance Universal Means-tested
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Australia ●●● ●●●
Austria ●●●●● T
Belgium ●●● ● FB ●
Canada ●● ● T ●
Czech Republic ●● ●● ●





Hungary ●●●●● FB ●
Iceland ● ●●●●●
Ireland ●●●SA ●● ●
Italy ●● ● FB
Japan ●● ●● ● ●
Korea ●● ● ● ●
Luxembourg ●● ● ● T
Netherlands ●● ● ● T ●
New Zealand ●●● ●●●
Norway ●●●●● ●
Poland ●● ●● FB
Portugal ●●● ● T
Slovak Republic ●● ● ● ●
Spain ●●● ● T
Sweden ●●●●● ●●
Switzerland ●● ● ●
United Kingdom ●●●●● ●










Notes: (1) "Y" indicates that the specific benefit or tax credit exists in this country. Where no specific housing or lone-parent benefit is available, "SA" (social assistance), or "FB" (family 
benefit) indicate that housing or lone-parent specific provisions exist as part of these schemes. (2) Cash social assistance benefits only. Because of its importance, the US Food 
Stamps, a 'near-cash' benefit programme, is indicated as well. 
Source: OECD Benefits and Wages policy database (www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives).    
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Finally, those who do not qualify for any unemployment benefit may receive social assistance 
benefits, with central or sub-central governments acting as providers of last resort. The main eligibility 
criteria therefore relate to available incomes and assets, and entitlements do not depend specifically on 
claimants’ work history. Income and asset tests can be very restrictive and always take into account the 
resources of other persons living with the benefit claimant. Eligibility may be conditional on the claimant’s 
effort to regain self-sufficiency. But while rules and practices vary substantially across countries, job-
search and other activity requirements can be much less demanding than in the case of unemployment 
benefits.
6 Social assistance is typically not subject to explicit time limits but is paid for as long as relevant 
conditions are met. Benefits often “top-up” income from other sources so as to ensure adequate income 
levels. Since bigger families require more resources to secure a given living standard, such top-ups are 
most likely when the benefit claimant has dependent family members. 
In addition to the main social assistance benefits there are other government transfers that have similar 
characteristics or can complement or substitute for social assistance payments: 
•  Low-income households may also qualify for cash housing benefits, which employ similar 
forms of means-testing. Benefit amounts are determined in relation to actual housing costs 
subject to relevant ceilings. Housing benefits may be administered as separate programmes or 
may be payable as part of social assistance entitlements. Unlike social assistance payments, 
dedicated housing benefit programmes are typically not accompanied by work-related 
requirements or interventions that seek to re-establish self-sufficiency. 
•  Families with children can claim family benefits in most countries (although the definition of 
what constitutes a “dependent child” varies considerably). Most countries provide special 
benefits for lone parents either in the form of additions to regular family or childcare benefits or 
as separate programmes. Where benefits for children or lone parents are means-tested, they can 
resemble social assistance benefits in all but name.
7 One difference concerns work-related 
activity requirements. Means-tested family benefits are frequently designed as temporary 
payments that enable one of the parents to spend time with their children. Apart from time limits 
(which can be generous and are often implicit, e.g. by specifying a maximum age for a dependent 
child: see Table 7), work-related behavioural requirements may therefore be minimal or non-
existent. 
•  Targeted income support is increasingly made available to those in work and can, to some extent, 
substitute for income top-ups provided by social assistance and other minimum-income benefits. 
Around half the OECD countries now operate employment-conditional benefits, or in-work 
benefits of one type or another (a few countries not shown in the table, such as Germany, have 
introduced such programmes since 2007). Like minimum-income benefits, some of these in-work 
programmes employ a family-based low-income criterion (but since they are conditional on 
                                                      
6 .  For instance, unlike unemployment benefit recipients in most countries, social assistance recipients often 
do not enjoy any legal job or status protection in the form of “suitable-job” criteria. Formally, they would 
therefore have to accept any available job although the extent to which this is enforced in practice is 
difficult to establish. Reasons for deviating from strict formal availability criteria may, for instance, be 
related to employers’ concerns that pushing referrals of “overqualified” benefit claimants could damage 
their motivation for the job (see, e.g., Box 3 in Tergeist and Grubb, 2006). 
7  .  In addition, several countries operate further parental-leave benefits that are not means-tested or are 
insurance-based (the OECD Family Database gives details: www.oecd.org/els/social/family/database).  
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work, they are not payable to those without any other incomes and therefore are not benefits of 
last resort).
8 
It is clear from this overview that minimum-income benefits can be provided under a range of 
different policy headings. What they have in common is that they are typically received by those with no or 
very limited other resources of their own, and can provide a fall-back safety-net for low-income families 
who are not entitled to other income replacement transfers. Figure 1 situates countries’ programmes along 
two dimensions: 
(1)  Rank: Main income support programme for working-age people or lower-tier benefit. 
(2)  Scope: Broad safety net or programme targeted at specific groups (notably lone parents).  
In most countries, minimum-income programmes take the form of lower-tier fall-back benefits for 
those not getting any support through other measures. Last-resort benefits with a broad scope are shown in 
the upper right-hand corner in Figure  1. The biggest group in this category are social assistance 
programmes providing cash and near-cash support (US Food Stamps, since 2008 Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program, SNAP). In addition, unemployment assistance benefits in Finland, Germany, Ireland 
and the UK are available independently of contribution records or previous employment history and can be 
counted as broad-scope lower-tier benefits.
9 There are further last-resort benefits targeted at lone parents in 
France, the UK and the US (lower right-hand corner; although the benefit for Norwegian lone parents of 
young children is formally an insurance benefit, it is also included here as eligibility is subject to an 
income test and does not require an employment record). 
In a few cases, minimum-income benefits are the main income support programme for the majority of 
the working-age population (upper left-hand corner of Figure  1) or for individual groups (younger 
individuals in Australia and lone parents in Australia, Ireland and New Zealand
10). In addition to these 
first-tier programmes, Australia and New Zealand also operate lower-tier emergency benefits, but these are 
much less common, and are not shown here. 
A small number of countries also operate targeted lower-tier minimum-income benefits that are not 
considered here, notably for individuals who are not able to work due to a disability, such as the US 
                                                      
8 .  For a recent summary of countries’ experience with these and related “make-work-pay” programmes, see 
Immervoll and Pearson (2009). In some cases, in-work benefits take the form of temporary payments that 
are designed to increase the payoff from moving into a new job. A larger group of countries operate 
programmes that make recurring payments (or tax refunds) to a defined group of low-income workers for 
as long as other eligibility conditions are met. In order to target in-work payments to relevant groups, 
eligibility and benefit amounts can depend on a range of characteristics and circumstances. These include 
having children, working a minimum number of hours, and receiving income from work or 
entering/changing employment. All employment-conditional measures use at least one of these conditions 
or they feature gradual phase-ins or phase-outs as a means of targeting individuals at specific earnings 
levels or working hours. For the purpose of targeting low-income individuals, incomes can be assessed 
individually for the benefit recipient or jointly for the couple or the family as a whole. While irrelevant for 
those living alone, the assessment unit can affect benefit entitlements in larger households. Benefits that are 
targeted in relation to family income tend to have more favourable distributional properties. Individual-
based in-work benefits are less well targeted towards poor households but avoid the adverse effect on 
second-earner work incentives associated with family-based benefit tapers. 
9 .  In Ireland, unemployment assistance (Jobseekers’ Allowance) is much more important than the general 
social assistance benefit (Supplementary Allowance). 
10 .  The Domestic Purposes Benefit in New Zealand also provides support for some other groups, such as those 
caring for family members at home.    
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Supplemental Security Income and the Irish Disability Allowance. In both cases, non-means-tested 
insurance-based programmes act as first-tier benefits. The New Zealand Invalid’s Benefit and the 
Australian Disability Support Pension are examples of means-tested first-tier benefits targeted at this 
group. 
Figure 1.  A typology: Rank and scope of minimum-income benefits 
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Unemployment Assistance:









fra* (allocation de parent isolé)
nor (transitional benefit)
uk (income support)
usa (TANF, SSP programs)
 
* As of mid-2009, the new French Active Solidarity Income (Revenue de Solidarité Active, RSA) has been available to all low-income 
families, including lone parents. The Allocation de Parent Isolé (API) was abolished. 
3.  Generosity: Benefit levels and related support measures 
3.1  Benefit levels in relation to median incomes and relative poverty thresholds 
Poverty avoidance or alleviation are primary objectives of minimum-income benefits. When 
comparing benefit generosity across countries, a useful starting point is therefore to look at benefit levels 
relative to commonly-used poverty thresholds. Figure 2 presents model calculations using the OECD tax-
benefit calculator. The resulting net income levels are then compared to median incomes from income 
distribution data. This shows that in a large majority of OECD countries for which such calculations are 
available, benefits of last resort can be significantly lower than the three alternative relative poverty lines 
(40%, 50% and 60% of median income). Individual poverty gaps are very large in some countries (there is 
no generally applicable social assistance benefit in Greece, Italy and Turkey) and other income sources are 
needed everywhere to avoid substantial poverty risks.  
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In a number of countries, however, the range of possible benefit entitlements can be very wide. This is 
illustrated using error bars in Figure  2, which show the difference in benefit entitlements between a 
situation where the recipient claims no housing costs and one where she lives in privately rented 
accommodation and obtains partial or full compensation for housing expenditures. Housing benefit 
calculations in this latter case are based on a simple “high”, but not unreasonably high, rent assumption 
across countries (20% of the average gross wage of a full-time worker).
11 For many benefit recipients, 
payment levels will be somewhere in-between the “with housing costs” and “without housing costs” 
scenarios. In about half the countries, benefit rates show in fact little or no variation with housing costs as 
housing support is not available at all, is modest (for instance, there is no separate mechanism to provide 
cash housing support in the US Food Stamp / SNAP program but housing costs slightly reduce reckonable 
income in some states) or is provided on a flat-rate basis (for instance, social assistance entitlements may 
be designed in a way to cover “reasonable” housing costs). 
Comparing across different family types, it turns out that net incomes of minimum-income recipients 
in families with children (second and third panel of Figure 2) tend to be higher relative to the respective 
poverty thresholds than for single persons (first panel). Consistent with heightened policy concerns about 
child poverty in many countries, this indicates that benefit provisions for children and other family 
members are, at least for poor households, typically more generous than would be implied by the 
equivalence scales typically used in income distribution studies.
12  
Figure 2.  Income levels provided by cash minimum-income benefits 
Net income value in % of median household incomes, 2007 










                                                      
11 .  The assumption of 20% of AW has been motivated by an attempt to capture differences between countries 
that operate explicit “reasonable rent” ceilings and those that do not (or where there is a large discretionary 
element involved in making such decisions). In order to show this, it is necessary to choose a rent level that 
is sufficiently high so that relevant limits become applicable. 
12 .  Median incomes in Figure 2 have been adjusted using the “square root of household size” scale. The 
weights implied the so-called “modified OECD scale”, which is commonly used in Europe although not at 
the OECD, implies somewhat more sizable scale economies for some of the family types shown in 
Figure 2, but smaller ones for others.    
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Figure 2 (continued)  




















Notes: Median net household incomes are for a year around 2005 expressed in 2007 prices and are before housing costs (or other 
forms of “committed” expenditure). Results are shown on an equivalised basis (equivalence scale is the square root of the household 
size) and account for all relevant cash benefits (social assistance, family benefits, housing-related cash support as indicated). US 
results also include the value of Food Stamps, a near-cash benefit. Income levels account for all cash benefit entitlements of a family 
with a working-age head, no other income sources and no entitlements to primary benefits such as unemployment insurance. They 
are net of any income taxes and social contributions. Where benefit rules are not determined on a national level but vary by region or 
municipality, results refer to a “typical” case (e.g. Michigan in the United States, the capital in some other countries). Calculations for 
families with children assume two children aged 4 and 6. “Error” bars indicate the range of benefit levels in countries where they 
depend on actual housing expenditure. The bottom end of the error bar shows the situation where no housing costs are claimed while 
the top end represents cash benefits for someone in privately-rented accommodation with rent plus other charges amounting to 20% 
of average gross full-time wages. 
Sources: OECD tax-benefit models (www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives) and OECD income distribution database.  
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Table 3.  Benefit phase-outs points and benefit withdrawal rates 
Single-person household, 2007 
earnings,
% of average 
wage
net income at 
this earnings 
level,








% of average 
wage
net income at 
this earnings 
level,







United Kingdom 11 24 86 52 91 78
Sweden 14 23 97 41 59 100
Canada 17 24 90 17 25 90
Czech Republic 17 23 100 86 105 62
Switzerland 17 24 100 41 56 100
Hungary 17 25 105 23 34 82
Portugal 19 31 80 19 31 80
Finland 19 28 82 44 61 88
Spain 19 30 100 19 30 100
Germany 20 37 67 38 63 79
France
(a) 20 32 95 37 57 80
A u s t r i a 2 03 19 7 3 04 69 8
K o r e a 2 24 07 6 2 24 07 6
B e l g i u m 2 24 49 4 2 24 49 4
Ireland 23 42 98 41 75 100
Slovak Republic 24 35 77 24 35 77
Poland 24 41 97 39 65 71
United States 25 30 32 33 38 30
Iceland
(b) 31 48 100 >150
Japan 32 51 79 32 51 89
Netherlands 33 45 98 47 61 98
Norway 34 48 98 34 48 98
A u s t r a l i a 3 76 16 1 4 57 36 5
Luxembourg 39 45 86 42 48 88
New Zealand 45 59 66 70 90 61
Denmark
(b) 46 51 38 106 109 45
minimum-income benefits assuming that housing 
expenditures are not claimed or are zero
benefits include claims for privately rented 
accommodation expenditures, where relevant
Notes: See explanatory notes to Figure 2. The marginal effective tax rate (METR) is calculated over an earnings interval from zero to 
the respective phase-out point. It is the fraction of any additional employment incomes that is “taxed away” by the combined effects of 
taxes and benefits withdrawals and therefore accounts for benefit tapers as well as income taxes and social contributions payable by 
the benefit recipient. 
a. Unlike the RMI programme shown in the table, the Revenue de Solidarité Active (RSA) which replaced RMI and API in 2009, is 
characterised by a flat phase-out range with marginal deduction rates of about 38%. At just under 120% of the full-time minimum 
wage, the phase-out point for a single person is almost three times higher than under the previous programmes. 
b. For Iceland, METRs are not shown in the right-hand half of the table since housing benefit are withdrawn over a very wide earnings 
range and METRs are therefore more driven by the tax system than by the benefit taper. To a lesser extent, the same argument can 
also be made in the case of Denmark. 
Sources: OECD tax-benefit models (www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives) and OECD income distribution database. 
The distributional impact of minimum-income benefits is however not limited to recipient families 
with incomes below the levels indicated in Figure 2. Because concerns about the efficiency costs of work 
disincentives lead many countries to employ gradual benefit phase-outs, those with non-benefit incomes    
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above the maximum benefit amounts can often still receive income top-ups.
13 Table 3 illustrates this by 
showing the approximate earnings levels, as well as the associated net incomes, where minimum-income 
benefits are fully phased out. 
Less than half the countries shown “fully” deduct earned incomes from benefit entitlements, with 
marginal effective tax rates (METRs) exceeding 90%. Where benefits are withdrawn at a much slower rate, 
minimum-income benefits in some countries extend support to non-poor recipients even if they do not lift 
the lowest income groups out of poverty. While results are only shown for singles, it turns out that phase-
out rates tend to be similar for other family types. Since benefit amounts are higher for larger families, the 
phase-out points are correspondingly higher up the earnings distribution in these cases. In some countries, 
and for some family types, income-tested in-work benefits may start being available around the earnings 
level where minimum-income benefits are fully phased out. In these cases, high METRs caused by benefit 
tapers can continue beyond the phase-out points shown in Table 3. 
3.2  Benefit levels relative to in-work incomes 
As illustrated by the METRs shown above, benefits are a key determinant of whether work “pays”, 
especially for those with limited earnings potential. Since minimum-income recipients without any earned 
income mostly have net incomes below commonly-used poverty thresholds, a relevant question is how 
much someone would need to earn in order to escape income poverty. This amount will depend on two 
factors. First, higher earnings are required in countries with sizable individual “poverty gaps” (the amount 
by which net income falls short of the chosen poverty line). Second, the earnings necessary to reach the 
poverty line is determined by the part of in-work earnings that adds to household net income (and, thus, the 
METR). 
                                                      
13 .  The combination of benefit phase-outs and high in-work tax burdens can lead to substantial ‘leaky bucket’-
type efficiency losses and, hence, very high marginal costs of redistributing extra amounts to the poor by 
raising minimum-income benefits. For instance, calculations for 15 EU countries reported by Immervoll et 
al. (2007) show that in countries with relatively generous existing welfare provisions, it typically costs 2.5 
euros or more to redistribute an extra euro in this way. However, the same calculations also indicate 
considerable scope for improving safety-nets where they are currently less developed. This is notably the 
case in some Southern European countries, where the costs of improving minimum-income provisions are 
much lower.  
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Figure 3.  Net incomes of benefit recipients and full-time minimum-wage earners 
in % of median household incomes, 2007 
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Figure 3 (continued) 
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Note: See explanatory notes to Figure 2. Hourly minimum wages are converted to monthly earnings based on 40 working hours per 
week. Where minimum wages depend on age, profession or sector, figures relate to the adult rate for white-collar workers in the 
private sector (Belgium, Greece, Portugal). The federal minimum is used for the US. Where there is no country-wide minimum, 
weighted averages of regional minimum wages are used (Japan). Incomes in the married-couple case are calculated assuming that 
there is only one earner. 
Sources: OECD tax-benefit models (www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives), OECD income distribution database and OECD 
minimum wage database. 
One way of showing the situation of low-wage earners is by reference to minimum wages. In around 
two thirds of the OECD countries, wages are subject to statutory minima. Comparisons based on gross 
minimum wage levels do not take into account differences in taxes and benefits and can therefore give only 
a partial indication about the true value of wage floors. Figure 3 shows incomes of full-time employees 
earning the statutory minimum wage after taxes and benefits and, as the earlier Figure 2, relates those to 
median household disposable income.
14 In the majority of countries, a full-time minimum-wage earner in a 
single-person household makes enough to put her above 50% of median household income and with the 
exception of the United States, full-time minimum-wage earnings are everywhere sufficient to ensure 
incomes above the 40% threshold (net incomes can be higher in the considerable number of states that 
operate statutory minima exceeding the US federal minimum wage). 
In the case of families, one minimum-wage job is typically not enough to escape relative poverty 
using the 50% threshold. However, in-work benefits and/or gradual benefit phase-out rates for families 
with children can provide a significant income boost. For instance, a lone-parent full-time minimum-wage 
worker in New Zealand, UK, Australia and Ireland takes home net income at or above 60% of median 
incomes. The net income gain from working in a full-time job typically exceeds 20%. But in a number of 
cases, the income gain is in fact quite limited, even if minimum wages are high (e.g. France, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands). Work incentive problems can especially be a problem for those entitled to housing-related 
benefits (as in Figure 2, such entitlements are indicated by the error bars). Finally, it is important to note 
that these income figures are before childcare costs. Even with relatively large income gains, lone parents 
with children requiring care may still consider that a full-time job does little to improve the family budget 
and that they are financially better off on benefits (OECD, 2007b, discusses childcare costs and work 
incentives in detail). 
                                                      
14 .  OECD (2007a) analyses the tax treatment of minimum wages on both the employee and employer side.  
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In general, the earnings needed to reach the poverty line increase with increasing family size, so that 
net incomes of lone-parent minimum-wage earners tend to be lower in relation to median incomes than for 
childless singles. But patterns differ across countries both in quantitative and in qualitative terms. For 
instance, while support for families with children is often structured in such a way as to make it easier for 
them to escape poverty than for their childless counterparts (e.g., Australia, Ireland, New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom), the reverse appears to be true in a few other countries (e.g., Spain, US). 
3.3 Benefit  levels  relative  to unemployment benefits 
Minimum-income benefits form an integral part of the redistribution system. In setting benefit 
amounts, policymakers need to consider not only poverty thresholds and the income position of low-wage 
workers, but also the levels of other, higher-tier benefit payments. Where minimum-income programs act 
as fall-back benefits for people not (or no longer) entitled to unemployment compensation, their generosity 
has important implications for the functioning of unemployment benefits. 
For instance, as a measure to facilitate effective job-search, unemployment benefit recipients are 
typically confronted with declining benefit payments or expiring entitlement once they have been out of 
work for a specified period. Such “threat points” reinforce job-search incentives and have been shown to 
improve job-finding rates, even before benefits are reduced.
15 But whether these measures have their 
intended effect depends in part on the existence and generosity of minimum-income benefits that may top 
up unemployment benefits, or substitute for them entirely. Such interactions may or may not be intended. 
One the one hand, substitution can be a concern as the required contact intensity with case workers is 
typically lower, and job-search requirements less demanding, for social assistance claimants than for those 
claiming unemployment benefits. 
                                                      
15 .  This effect has been documented in numerous stuies in the US (Card and Levine, 2000; Katz and Meyer, 
1990) as well as in Europe (Roed and Zhang, 2003; Lalive et al., 2006). However, more recently, a few 
authors have questioned whether this phenomenon is as economically significant as the earlier studies 
appear to indicate (Card et al., 2007; Boon and van Ours, 2009).    
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Table 4.  Minimum-income benefit levels relative to unemployment benefits 
(1) 

















Australia 1+ 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1-9 91 114 97 113 66 84 79 92
10+ 99 124 103 119 72 91 84 97
1-12 61 81 91 87 61 81 91 87
13+ 73 81 89 85 73 81 89 85
Canada 1-8 49 75 80 85 36 55 64 68
Czech Republic 1-6 92 120 98 122 76 100 88 106
Denmark 1-48 
(3) 97 89 94 103 97 89 94 103
1-23 
(3) 92 107 79 110 87 98 74 104
24+ 122 140 94 141 122 140 94 142
1-23 70 91 86 97 51 65 71 80
24+ 105 121 111 125 105 121 111 125
Germany 1-12 79 99 107 106 58 76 92 90
1-3 42 73 75 89 39 68 72 85
4-9 70 127 107 127 70 127 107 127
10-12 102 185 130 156 102 185 130 156
1-4 81 113 85 108 70 93 78 94
5-36 92 135 90 118 92 135 90 118
Ireland 1-15 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Japan 1-9 64 92 107 134 54 78 103 115
Korea 1-7 45 73 97 119 34 55 75 89
Luxembourg 1-12 70 97 79 100 50 67 58 73
1-2 103 106 90 101 73 89 79 88
3-22 108 109 92 102 78 94 83 92
New Zealand 1+ 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1-24 80 111 92 134 60 85 83 106
24+ 80 111 92 134 60 85 83 106
1-12 54 76 54 76
1-18 
(4) 77 97 77 97
1-28 30 60 65 92 20 40 45 65
29-42 56 89 91 129 56 89 91 129
Slovak Republic 1-6 46 76 77 93 31 51 54 65
1-6 43 54 64 72 38 46 47 51
7-24 49 63 75 84 38 46 54 60
1-9 
(3) 84 105 71 105 84 105 71 105
10-28 93 116 74 111 84 105 71 105
Switzerland 1-18 87 110 97 109 68 84 69 78
United Kingdom 1-6 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
United States 1-6 


















below-average earner (67% of AW) average earner (100% of AW)
No children
2 children
(ages 4 and 6)
No children
2 children
(ages 4 and 6)
 
Notes: 
(1)  Housing-related support is included in the net incomes of both the unemployment and minimum-income recipients (using 
housing-cost assumptions as explained in the notes to Figure 2). Greece, Italy, Mexico and Turkey are not shown as they do not 
operate broad minimum-income cash-benefit programmes (nor, in the case of Mexico, a generally available unemployment benefit 
system). (2)  The period indicates the maximum duration of unemployment benefits for a 40-year old worker with a ‘long’ employment 
and contribution record. Separate periods are shown for each successive benefit programme (e.g. insurance and assistance benefits) 
or if benefit levels in a given programme decline during the entitlement period. (3)  Membership in the unemployment insurance fund 
is voluntary. (4)  Unemployment benefit durations are longer for families with children. (5)  Unemployment benefit durations are longer 
in states where the unemployment rate exceeds a specified level. 
AW denotes the average wage of a full-time worker in industry sectors C-K (ISIC Revision 3.1). 
Source: OECD tax-benefit models (www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives).  
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On the other hand, the balance of the two main objectives of unemployment compensation 
(facilitating job search and providing a degree of income security) may change depending on the labour-
market situation. For instance, as job vacancies dry up during a recession, and demand-side restrictions 
become more binding, job-search incentives may be less effective and concerns about the adequacy of 
income support for the growing number of longer-term unemployed may become more pressing. In this 
case, the existence and availability of minimum-income benefits may provide a welcome mechanism that 
provides additional protection for job searchers and their families. 
Table  4 shows income levels of minimum-income recipients relative to those provided by 
unemployment benefits. Where unemployment benefits are paid at different rates depending on the 
duration of unemployment, separate lines are shown for each possible benefit level. Unsurprisingly, ratios 
between minimum-income and unemployment benefits tend to be higher for those experiencing declining 
unemployment benefits during a longer unemployment spell, notably in countries operating both 
unemployment insurance and assistance benefits (see Table  2). In most cases, however, initial 
unemployment benefits provide incomes that are significantly above minimum-income levels. The gap 
between the two is greatest in Hungary and Poland, Japan and Korea, Portugal and Spain, as well as 
Canada and the United States – especially for unemployed individuals living alone. However, for those 
with below-average previous earnings, some earnings-related unemployment insurance benefits can be 
quite close to, or even below, the level of social assistance or other minimum-income benefits. This is the 
case for one-earner couples in a number of continental and all northern European countries, as well as in 
the Czech Republic. 
In countries where minimum-income benefits are at the same time the main out-of-work benefit, the 
ratios are 100% (Australia, New Zealand). The same is true for Ireland and the UK, where eligible 
jobseekers are entitled to a flat-rate insurance benefit during an initial period of unemployment and the 
follow-up assistance benefit is paid at the same level as long as the family has no other incomes. 
A ratio of minimum-income to unemployment benefit levels above 100% provides an indication of 
the potential importance of minimum-income payments as top-up benefits for those with low 
unemployment benefit entitlements.
16 This can provide useful contextual information for understanding the 
characteristics of benefit recipients. For instance, for most family types, the net incomes provided by the 
Finnish Basic Allowance and Labour Market Support benefits (paid to jobseekers who are not – or no 
longer – entitled to earnings-related unemployment insurance payments) tend to be below social assistance 
levels. As a result, about 40% of social assistance recipients are receiving these unemployment benefits at 
the same time (STAKES, 2008). Since they are therefore already registered as jobseekers and have access 
to relevant support from the Public Employment Service, this has important implications for the scope of 
reintegration services to be provided by the social assistance administration. 
3.4 Related  support  measures:  Health-care 
In addition to cash support, countries operate a number of further programmes to address the needs of 
social-assistance clients. This includes ‘near-cash’ or in-kind support which may provide help with basic 
consumption items on a regular or case-by-case basis (such as for food, clothing, housing or transport), as 
well as assistance that seeks to promote reintegration and self-sufficiency (such as education, training, or 
rehabilitation measures). 
                                                      
16  .  In combination with the income levels of minimum-income recipients relative to the poverty line in 
Figure 2, it also indicates the extent to which unemployment benefit claimants are likely to be affected by 
income poverty.    
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Access to healthcare is one type of support that is especially important for the current and future well-
being of benefit clients and their families. Where employment barriers are health-related, it is also an 
essential component of reintegration and rehabilitation strategies. Because of the high cost of health-related 
services and products, support in this area can make a big difference to the living standard and the work 
incentives of benefit recipients. 
Table 5 summarises responses to a recent questionnaire on health-related support sent to responsible 
government departments in OECD member countries. This questionnaire collected information on basic 
healthcare coverage of benefit recipients and low-income groups, including those in irregular or low-paid 
work. It covered support for meeting the cost of health coverage, as well as help with out-of-pocket 
payments, such as deductibles or copayments. This latter category is important because out-of-pocket 
expenses for hospitalisation, doctor visits or items such as eye-glasses or dental products, can be high 
relative to the budgets of low-income families, even if these families are covered under the basic healthcare 
scheme. 
Where basic healthcare is financed out of general tax revenues, coverage is universal with citizenship 
or residence being the only condition for access (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom). As a result, benefit recipients, as well as other low-
income groups, are automatically covered and help with paying for coverage is not needed (in Australia, a 
medical levy is administered as part of the income tax and this payment is not due for low-income 
individuals). However, most of these countries provide help with meeting out-of-pocket expenditures for 
low-income groups (Australia, Denmark, Iceland) or recipients of unemployment benefits (‘UB’ in the 
table) or social assistance (‘SA’). 
Where healthcare is insurance-based, membership in public or private insurance programmes may be 
mandatory so that coverage can also be de facto universal (Czech Republic, Finland, Japan, Korea, 
Netherlands, Switzerland). Where this is not the case, uninsured family members, such as those without 
work, can be covered alongside an insured person at no additional cost (Belgium, France, Germany, 
Greece, Luxembourg, Poland). Yet, in a number of countries, those with low or irregular employment 
incomes may not be covered on a mandatory basis, although they generally have the option of contributing 
(Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, Poland). In the United States, a large proportion of workers are 
not covered by employment-based insurance, and often have income too high to be eligible for state-
supported programmes. 
In almost all OECD countries, benefit recipients are normally covered automatically at no or reduced 
cost. Such concessions are often lost when moving to a low-wage job (e.g. France, Germany, Hungary, 
Japan), although contributions in most countries are a percentage of earnings and are therefore lower for 
low-paid workers. In more than a third of the countries surveyed, benefit recipients (as well as low-income 
groups) are also entitled to lower out-of-pocket payments for medical goods or services. In the United 
States, there is no automatic health coverage for benefit recipients (Medicaid, the main public programme 
for low-income working-age individuals, covered about 40% of those below the official poverty line in 
2007). 
In a number of countries, health-related support for benefit recipients is financed directly by the 
relevant benefit agency (bottom of Table 5). Funding arrangements that oblige benefit-paying institutions 




Table 5.  Health-related support for benefit recipients and low-income groups 


















'univeral' coverage yes no no yes yes yes yes yes









(e.g. groups who do not have to 
contribute on a mandatory basis)
n/a
if earnings < 
contribution 
threshold
if earnings < 
contribution 
threshold
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Concessions 1: Insurance cost
low -income individuals
no medicare 





reduced or no 
contributions









SA, UB (subject to 
income limit)
other -- -- -- n/a
adults caring for a 
child up to age 4.
n/a no
no (but employers 
often entitled to 
reduced contributions, 
e.g. certain regions or 
groups of w orkers)
different coverage for those paying 
preferential rates?
no no no n/a no n/a n/a no
Concessions 2: Out-of-pocket 
low -income individuals yes yes yes no
no (but system of user 
fees introduced in '08)




yes (free or subsidised 
complementary 
coverage)
benefit recipients yes (automatic) SA
UB recipients aged 




no (but system of user 
fees introduced in '08)
n/a SA
SA, UB (subject to 
income limit)
other -- -- --
First Nations and 





















central gov't; insurance 
institution; private 
insurance providers
benefit recipients -- UB: PES; SA: state see above provincial gov'ts central gov't n/a -- same as above
other -- -- -- central gov't --
municipality, 50% 
reimbursed by central 
gov't 
central gov't subsidies 
to municipalities (vary 
w ith local unemp. rate)
central gov't
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Table 5 (continued).  Health-related support for benefit recipients and low-income groups 














'univeral' coverage no no no yes yes  yes
derived rights for uninsured family 
members












(e.g. groups w ho do not have to 
contribute on a mandatory basis)
(i) if earnings < contrib. 
threshold; (ii) if 
earnings > upper limit
unemployed w ith short 
contrib. histories (but 
then covered under in-
kind health insurance)
-- n/a -- n/a
Concessions 1: Insurance cost
low -income individuals
reduced minimum 
payment for low -
income self-employed
no
individuals in 'social need', 
e.g. the homeless
n/a




UB & SA (if insured 
before claiming)
no
recipients of insurance, 
assistance, and family 
benefits
n/a




recipients of maternity 
and parental-leave 
benefits (if insured 
before)




living in remote 
areas
different coverage for those paying 
preferential rates?
no n/a no n/a no no
Concessions 2: Out-of-pocket 
low -income individuals
annual copayments 
capped at 2% of 
household income 
no
possible exemptions (e.g. 
for low -income elderly)
yes -- no
benefit recipients









possible exemptions for 
dental care (e.g. children, 
pregnant or elderly patients, 
emergency treatment)
no --













UB & SA: responsible 
benefit office
n/a same as above central gov't central gov't n/a





Table 5 (continued).  Health-related support for benefit recipients and low-income groups 












'univeral' coverage no yes yes yes no








(e.g. groups w ho do not have to 
contribute on a mandatory basis)
irregular or 
temporary w orkers
(<3 months per 
year)
n/a n/a n/a irregular or temporary w orkers





(tax allowance to cover 
part of contribution)
n/a n/a uninsured may apply for free healthcare
benefit recipients same as above no n/a n/a
exempt: registered unemployed; 
recipients of SA, maternity/parental-
leave benefits
other same as above no n/a n/a
(a) reduced contributions for some 
pensioners; (b) eligible for free 
healthcare: children, w omen during 
pregnance and child delivery, refugees, 
those w ith substance abuse issues
different coverage for those paying 
preferential rates?
no no n/a n/a no
Concessions 2: Out-of-pocket 
low -income individuals no no n/a
co-payments subject to 
annual ceiling
co-payments for certain rehabilitation 
measures depend on income
benefit recipients no no n/a same as above SA: medication costs can be refunded
other no no




co-payments subject to 
annual ceiling; 
exemptions for children, 






central gov't n/a central gov't
benefit recipients same as above n/a n/a central & local gov't
other same as above n/a central gov't central gov't
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Table 5 (continued).  Health-related support for benefit recipients and low-income groups 














'univeral' coverage yes yes yes yes yes no
derived rights for uninsured family 
members
n/a n/a n/a no n/a no
potentially not covered
(e.g. groups w ho do not have to 
contribute on a mandatory basis)
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
families w ithout employment-based 
insurance and not entitled to 
targeted public programs (non-
coverage 15% overall)
Concessions 1: Insurance cost




Medicaid: Income+other conditions 
vary by state. CHIPS: Higher income 
limits for children's coverage.
benefit recipients n/a n/a n/a -- n/a
unemployed have option to join 
group-based insurance at reduced 
rates; SSP: covered by Medicaid
other n/a n/a n/a -- n/a
blind, pregnant w omen w ith young 
children covered by Medicaid
different coverage for those paying 
preferential rates?
n/a n/a n/a no n/a
emergency treatment must be pro-
vided; access difficult for uninsured
Concessions 2: Out-of-pocket 
low -income individuals
exemptions for the 
economically 
disadvantaged
no no no no
rules about out-of-pocket payments 
under Medicaid vary by state. 
benefit recipients -- no SA no
UA; SA; in-work 




pregnant w omen, 
children, low -income 
pensioners
no no --
individuals w ith special 
medical conditions, 








Medicaid: state and federal gov't; 
CHIPS: federal
benefit recipients n/a n/a -- -- central gov't Medicaid: state and federal gov't
other central gov't n/a n/a -- n/a same as above
 
Notes: Countries are not shown if no responses were received at the time of writing. ‘n/a’: not applicable; ‘--‘: information not received or incomplete; ‘UB’ : unemployment benefits; ‘UA’: unemployment assistance; ‘SA’: social assistance. 
Source: Country responses to OECD questionnaire on health-related support for benefit recipients.  
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4. Recipients 
Data on the number of people covered by minimum-income benefits in OECD countries are not 
currently available on a comprehensive basis.
17 One source that does show recipient numbers for ‘non-
categorical’ social assistance as well as lone-parent benefits for a subset of OECD countries is Carcillo and 
Grubb (2006), who compiled information from a range of available administrative data sources (OECD, 
2003a, contains further data and a detailed discussion of methods and concepts). For the purpose of that 
study, it was necessary to avoid double-counting benefit recipients who receive multiple benefits at the 
same time (or at different times during the same year). It therefore made sense to categorise recipients 
according to the main out-of-work benefit they received. As a result, those receiving both social assistance 
and unemployment benefits would normally not show up in the social assistance recipient totals. Perhaps 
more importantly, the administrative data relate to claimants while minimum-income benefits are targeted 
towards families. For the purpose of analysing the redistributive scope of minimum-income benefits, one 
would typically be less interested in claimant counts and more in the number of individuals who live in a 
beneficiary household. 
With these limitations in mind, the data provided by Carcillo and Grubb show that the shares of 
working-age individuals receiving benefits of last resort are modest, mostly between 2 to 4 percent but 
below 2 percent in a few countries. The policy significance of these benefits is, however, greater than these 
figures suggest. As highlighted above, the statistics only count one adult per family as a recipient; the 
number of individuals whose families are supported by minimum-income benefits is higher. More 
importantly, behavioural requirements and other barriers (such as the perceived burden of filing an 
application) in effect exclude some of those who would otherwise be entitled. Studies on benefit take-up 
regularly find very high non-take-up rates for means-tested benefits in the order of 40% or more, indicating 
that the deterrent effect of the various barriers combined is indeed significant (Hernanz et al., 2004; 
Bargain et al., 2009). Finally, because out-of-work benefits affect both income levels and work incentives, 
their generosity and structure has implications for both recipients and non-recipients. For instance, to the 
extent that they achieve their objectives, work-related requirements reduce benefit dependency by 
strengthening labour-market attachment. 
Considering these effects in combination, one can expect low-income groups potentially targeted by 
social assistance benefits to be much more sizable than indicated by the above recipiency statistics. This is 
confirmed by calculations combining survey data with a detailed representation of benefit entitlement rules. 
For instance, in the late 1990s, 8 percent of working-age adults in the US lived in households whose income 
position would have made them eligible for social assistance-type cash transfers at some point during the year 
(i.e., without counting near-cash benefits such as Food Stamps). In Germany, the corresponding figure is as 
high as 14 percent.
18 Over a longer time-period, the proportion of individuals who experience at least one 
spell where family incomes fall below minimum-income thresholds will be even higher. 
                                                      
17  .  Since ‘activating’ policy approaches seek to encourage labour market attachment and reduce benefit 
dependency, one critical outcome of such policies is the pattern of transitions into and out of benefit 
receipt. Even more so than in the case of comparable aggregate beneficiary statistics, there is currently very 
little data on who moves onto minimum-income benefits, the typical duration of their benefit receipt, and 
whether those no longer drawing on income support quickly return to the benefit rolls or remain off benefit 
for longer periods. A recent study by Cappellari and Jenkins (2008) provides important insights on these 
dynamic aspects using household panel data for the United Kingdom. They also summarise methodological 
issues and present a method that could be used to perform similar analyses for other countries where good-
quality household panel data are available. 
18.  The Secretariat has commissioned these calculations as part of a project entitled “Welfare Implications of 
Social Protection”. See Dang et al. (2006). They are based on the assumptions of 100% benefit-takeup and 
full compliance with activity requirements and related eligibility conditions.    
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In view of the poverty alleviation objectives of minimum-income benefits, and the findings of high 
non-take-up rates, an important perspective of recipiency statistics is the fraction of poor people that these 
benefits reach. As an illustration of orders of magnitude, Figure 4 below combines administrative data on 
benefit recipients for two Nordic countries with survey-based totals of the number of income-poor 
households. The resulting proportions are “pseudo coverage rates” in the sense that they express the 
relative sizes of two groups that may only be partially overlapping (a number of non-poor households may 
receive minimum-income benefits). Two observations stand out. First, it is clear that a large number of 
income-poor households do not receive minimum-income support even in countries where benefit levels 
are relatively generous. Since benefit levels (see Figure 2 above) are close to the poverty cut-off in both 
countries, the principal driving factors are likely to be non-take-up as well as non-income characteristics 
that may make some of the income-poor households ineligible (notably assets or non-compliance with job-
search or other activity requirements).  
Figure 4.  Number of households receiving minimum-income benefits relative to income-poor households 














Sources: Author’s calculations based on the following sources. Benefit recipiency data: update of the data series described in Carcillo 
and Grubb (2006); Number of poor households: OECD income distribution database. 
A second striking pattern of the “pseudo” coverage rates is the extent of their variability over time. 
Given uncommonly high unemployment rates in Nordic countries during the mid-nineties, this illustrates 
the counter-cyclical role of minimum-income safety-nets even in countries where unemployment benefits 
generosity and durations are above the OECD average. It also suggests that demand for minimum-income 
support will grow significantly and that safety nets could be severely tested during the current economic 
downturn. But the downward trend also highlights the important role of “mutual obligations” policies and 
other measures aiming to reduce dependency on last-resort benefits: While labour markets weakened 
between 2000 and 2005 in both Norway and Sweden, the number of minimum-income benefit claimants 
continued to decline (both in absolute terms and as a proportion of poor households). 
5. Responsibilities  of  benefit  recipients 
5.1  Why “rights and responsibilities”? 
The large numbers of individuals potentially entitled to receiving minimum-income benefits highlight 
the importance of an appropriate balance between encouraging self-sufficiency and providing assistance 
for those who cannot support themselves. A simple income guarantee with no conditions attached could  
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result in very high rates of benefit dependency and the possibility of a downward spiral of weak work 
incentives and declining employability. Depending on the generosity of support, it could also be very 
costly for the public finances. Budgetary pressures are one likely reason why governments have 
increasingly considered a more work-oriented approach to minimum-income benefits. A welfare-to-work 
approach may also make income support for low-income groups politically more acceptable. 
Another reason is that, in most countries, last-resort benefit payments alone simply do not provide 
enough income to ensure effective protection from income poverty. Where more generous benefit 
payments are economically or politically infeasible, there is therefore a strong case for structuring financial 
support in a way that enables and encourages benefit recipients to seek income from employment. There is 
convincing evidence that welfare-to-work policies can be effective at increasing employment levels among 
the groups most likely to draw on minimum-income benefits. Several initiatives that have targeted safety-
net benefit recipients show that substantial shares of them do respond to these measures: if the conditions 
are right, they will work and reduce their reliance on public support. 
However, the large numbers of individuals “potentially entitled” to minimum-income benefits could 
also indicate that many may simply be unable to earn incomes above the levels that these benefits provide. 
There is therefore a real danger that severe behavioural requirements, strictly enforced, would lead to much 
higher poverty risks. For instance, there is evidence for the US that, while many lone parents have left 
welfare and found work, as many as 25% of them are neither employed nor receiving welfare benefits.
19 
Even if strict eligibility conditions are successful at increasing employment and reducing poverty rates 
overall, families excluded from the benefit can face much deeper poverty, which is a concern in itself and 
can also lead to political backlash. In addition to the direct income effect, overly-strict eligibility conditions 
and rigorous gate-keeping can also have negative consequences for the effectiveness of employment-
oriented policies: those excluded from benefit payments may de facto have no or incomplete access to job-
search assistance and other counselling or re-integration measures; by dropping out of the system, they are 
then no longer “reachable”. Finally, there have been concerns about the appropriateness of an 
indiscriminate pursuance of the self-sufficiency objective itself. This issue is, for instance, central to the 
question of whether and for how long lone parents should be exempt from activity requirements and 
whether such requirements are appropriate for individuals facing severe social difficulties. It is possible 
that “families who are in turmoil or who cannot organize their lives sufficiently to comply with the rules 
are the same ones who are forced off welfare, and are likely to be worse off as a result.“ (Moffitt, 2008, p. 
22). 
Compared with unemployment benefit recipients, those entitled to lower-tier income support face 
greater employment difficulties on average. Training, public sector job creation programmes and other 
active labour market programmes (ALMPs) can help address some of these difficulties. But existing 
research shows that targeting is key and that overall success rates might be low especially for those facing 
substantial or multiple employment barriers. In terms of beneficiaries’ responsibilities, the notion that 
public support ought to be linked to behavioural requirements is more controversial when applied to 
individuals who are faced with multiple or particularly serious challenges to finding paid work or who see 
little gain from substituting earnings for state transfers. 
In spite of these challenges, minimum safety-net benefits are of particular significance in this debate. 
First, since there is generally little other public support to fall back on, too strict an application of 
behavioural eligibility conditions could result in extremely low incomes for those excluded from benefit 
payments. Concerns about those potentially ‘falling through the cracks’ become more acute if potential 
beneficiaries fail to live up to their responsibilities, not because they are unwilling but because they are 
unable to comply.  
                                                      
19.  See Blank (2007).    
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Second, there are important links between benefits of last resort and other, higher-tier, support 
systems. As entitlements to primary out-of-work benefits such as unemployment insurance payments are 
tied more visibly to job-search and availability criteria, lower-tier assistance benefits are likely to play a 
stronger role as a fall-back option. Whether or not such benefit substitution is intended, there is a clear 
need to co-ordinate activation and re-integration policies between the different benefit layers (as noted 
above, some English-speaking countries operate only one main layer of income support, although even 
then, other benefits may, under specific circumstances, be granted to individuals not entitled to the primary 
transfer). 
Finally, the group of low-income individuals relying on benefits of last resort is very heterogeneous. It 
includes those with low-paid, irregular or undeclared employment, the long-term unemployed, individuals 
who have never worked, those with disabilities, health problems or substance abuse issues, those requiring 
support because of difficult family or social circumstances (including lone parents, migrants and victims of 
family violence), homeless people, those released from a penal institution, and those facing any 
combination of the above. Any strategy to encourage self-sufficiency among such a diverse client group is 
likely to be both complex and demanding. The challenge is to channel the right type of support to the right 
people while responding to a broad range of different circumstances and needs. 
5.2  Targeting: The right mix of rights and responsibilities, for the right people, at the right time 
In essence, the attraction of a ‘rights and responsibilities’ approach is that it potentially increases 
employment while improving the targeting of minimum safety nets. By imposing more demanding 
behavioural conditions for benefit receipt, it makes work relatively more attractive and limits opportunities 
for benefit claims that might be considered “undeserving” (e.g. those with incomes from undeclared 
employment or a strong preference for leisure). At the same time, work-related behavioural requirements 
seek to improve employability. Both effects would in theory reduce the number of beneficiaries, and this 
effect can be further strengthened by providing job-search assistance and other employment-oriented 
support. With a reduced number of beneficiaries and stronger work incentives, more adequate support is 
feasible for those who need it most. 
But a second concern of targeting efficiency is that those unable to achieve self-sufficiency should not 
be left without sufficient support. As discussed, the downside of stringent requirements is that they can 
make support inaccessible for some. Sanctioning those unable to comply reduces benefit expenditures but 
clearly makes little sense from a redistribution point of view. Policymakers would likely be concerned if 
sanctions for failing to comply with work requirements are frequently applied to individuals who are in 
fact not ready for work. Evidence suggesting such a pattern in the US shows that this is a real danger 
(Pavetti et al., 2003). For instance, decisions about sanctions can be affected by administrative error with 
potentially grave consequences for sanctioned families. In this context, a transparent and efficient appeals 
process, while costly to operate, is an important element of an effective benefit administration. By 
providing some evidence on the frequency of unjustified sanctions, it can also help uncover structural 
problems, such as insufficient resources to properly account for clients’ circumstances. Children, who are 
directly affected by benefit cuts but can do little to avoid them, are a group of particular concern (although 
many countries implicitly recognise this by protecting child-related benefit amounts from sanctions, this 
does not protect children from deteriorating living standards caused by cuts in non-child-related benefit 
components). 
This issue can in principle be tackled from two sides. First, behavioural obligations, and the sanctions 
that back them up, should take account of individual circumstances. Second, those who are not job-ready 
should be given an opportunity to participate in programmes aiming to overcome employment barriers. 
Participation in these support programmes can be made mandatory. Other work-related support measures  
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should seek to address barriers that are not primarily related to the employability of the individual (e.g. 
childcare for parents). 
Targeting is therefore key on both ends of the mutual obligations. In view of the wide heterogeneity 
of the group of minimum-income benefit recipients, implementing effective targeting mechanisms presents 
a major challenge, however. 
Providing customised packages of client support and obligations requires detailed information and 
adequate staff and other resources. Statistical profiling approaches can help exploit available information 
but they are no substitute for intensive and face-to-face contact with claimants, especially in the more 
difficult cases where clients face severe or multiple barriers to social or economic participation. This type 
of interaction requires a significant commitment of staff resources and, hence, public expenditures to 
provide the necessary service capacity. One way to make service delivery potentially more responsive to 
claimants’ circumstances is to decentralise service delivery and possibly also administrative 
responsibilities for social assistance benefit payments. The funding mechanisms themselves can also have 
a direct effect on how support is targeted in practice. For instance, a rights-based entitlement to financial 
support is likely to put less pressure on case workers to deny benefit payments than a ‘queuing’ system 
whereby support is subject to availability of funds (as was the case in Poland prior to a 2004 reform, and is 
the case for those claiming TANF support in the US, although prior to the current recession, funding limits 
have generally been non-binding due to declining caseloads). Some of these institutional issues will be 
taken up below. 
Beyond matching claimants with appropriate interventions, targeting also has an important time 
dimension. Clearly, job-search assistance, labour market re-integration programmes and work requirements 
are most effective when suitably sequenced. This may also mean employing different types of 
requirements and support measures at the same time. For instance, one would expect synergies of 
combining job-search obligations with employment counselling. Mandating certain activities can however 
be counter-productive if they compromise the individual’s own initiative to escape benefit dependency. For 
instance, job-training or counselling may leave too little time for formal and informal job search (the so-
called ‘lock-in’ effect of mandatory participation in ALMPs). Yet, an overly aggressive push for work that 
does not allow for a sufficiently careful job-search may reduce the quality of job matches and result in less 
stable employment. 
Some of these timing issues have received considerable attention in the debate on activating recipients 
of first-tier unemployment benefits but have been shown to be of less practical relevance for the more 
disadvantaged recipients of social assistance. A likely reason is that the nature of the employment barriers 
facing the latter group is such that they are on average less likely to succeed at independent job-search 
activities. But due to the heterogeneity of the group of welfare recipients, timing issues can be expected to 
be significant nonetheless for some sub-groups. For young welfare recipients, the existing evidence 
suggests that work requirements should start at a very early stage as lacking work experience seems to be 
the main barrier to employment (Martin and Grubb, 2001). As noted, there are also important, and 
controversial, timing issues for lone parents as compulsory work or participation in labour market 
programmes means that they can spend less time with their (possibly young) children. 
5.3  An illustration of benefit recipients’ obligations 
Using responses to a recent questionnaire on this topic, Table 6 summarises the main behavioural 
requirements, as well as the sanctions that may be used to enforce them. Behavioural requirements vary 
both across countries and across programmes within countries. Importantly, the table relates mostly to 
legal provisions (and sometimes administrative guidelines). Information about the implementation of these 
provisions in practice is currently patchy, although an on-going review of activation policies has resulted in    
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detailed information for a number of countries (see footnote 1). Such information would be particularly 
relevant when assessing the relevance of different requirements in countries where programme 
implementation is highly decentralised. 
Behavioural requirements tend to be well defined in countries where the main social assistance 
scheme is at the same time the principal benefit for all or many registered unemployed (e.g. Australia, New 
Zealand, United Kingdom). In most other countries for which information has been received, provisions 
for behavioural requirements appear to be less comprehensive. 
A requirement to register with the public employment service (PES) indicates that gaining or restoring 
self-sufficiency is an objective, but it does not necessarily mean that explicit job-search requirements exist 
or that they are strictly enforced. A lack of explicit standards for independent job search in most countries 
suggests an underlying presumption of low success rates among welfare benefit recipients at informal job 
search, and, correspondingly, that the likelihood of successful labour market integration could be increased 
by using a more structured and formal process. 
Specific job-suitability criteria (relating, e.g., to working hours and conditions, pay, location, or type 
of activity) exist in the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, New Zealand, the Slovak Republic and Spain. 
In these cases, jobs that are offered but do not meet specified criteria can be refused without triggering a 
benefit sanction. In a number of other countries, suitability criteria exist but are non-explicit or are largely 
subject to case-worker discretion. 
In addition to the obligation of accepting or applying for available regular jobs, requirements can also 
extend to accepting a slot in a labour market programme, which may include work-like activities in the 
public or non-profit sector aiming, for instance, at strengthening basic job-related skills. They can also 
reflect a strict mutual obligations framework in which benefit recipients are required to work in return for 
receiving benefits (“workfare”) with no or little additional pay (e.g., Work for the Dole in Australia or the 
so-called “1-euro jobs” in Germany). 
Reflecting the fact that minimum-income benefits are family-based payments, several countries 
extend behavioural requirements to family members other than the benefit claimant (“Requirements extend 
to other Family Members” in Table 6). A number of countries have recently tightened work-availability 
criteria for the partners of benefit recipients (e.g., Germany, United Kingdom, although responses on the 
relevant item are missing for several countries), although exemptions are usually in place for partners with 
caring responsibilities and for family members who follow a recognised education programme. 
One-off or recurring intensive client interviews are used in all countries where information on this 
item was provided. Intensive interviews combine aspects of both behavioural requirements (there is an 
obligation to attend) and reintegration services mentioned in the previous section (interviews can be 
opportunities for providing job-search guidance or pointing out assistance to which clients are entitled). 
Either way, interviews are an essential tool for determining client needs, matching them with available 
reintegration services and assessing progress towards reintegration objectives. An initial intensive 
interview can be the basis for agreeing an individual ‘action plan’, a contract-type document that explicitly 
defines client rights and responsibilities and sets out measures intended to address the client’s difficulties, 
as well as reintegration objectives. In subsequent interview sessions, the effectiveness of interventions and 
reintegration measures can be assessed against these objectives, with confirmation or adaptations of the 
action plan as needed. In addition to their role in customising and managing the integration process, 
individual action plans also serve as a motivational device that provides clients with a set of clear personal 
objectives to work towards.  
  32
Most, but not all, countries provide for the possibility of sanctions for welfare-benefit recipients 
(benefit reductions, suspensions or stops). The scope and structure of sanctions can be a reflection of their 
underlying objective. For instance, sanctions may be partial or temporary if the aim is to correct non-
compliant behaviour, while more severe sanctions might be expected if the objective is to generally tighten 
access to benefits or to reduce beneficiary numbers. Questionnaire responses indicate that in the case of 
minor infringements, such as failing to provide information requested by the benefit agency, some 
countries only issue warnings (Australia, Japan). In most other countries that provided responses, minor 
cases of non-compliance trigger a partial benefit reduction. New Zealand, Spain, the United Kingdom and 
the United States appear to suspend benefits until compliance is re-established, or for a certain minimum 
period. In most countries, there is a possibility of suspending benefit payments for more severe cases of 
non-compliance (e.g. failing to attend a scheduled interview) or repeated infringements. Cases of major 
non-compliance (such as failing to accept a job offer or non-participation in labour market programmes) 
tend to make an individual ineligible for the benefit, although benefits are sometimes suspended for a 
defined period of time, rather than stopped entirely. 
In practice, concerns over income adequacy may make sanctions partial, even in cases of major non-
compliance. For instance, reductions or suspensions may only apply to those portions of the benefit that 
relate to the non-complying individual while amounts intended to cover the needs of spouses and children 
may be unaffected (e.g., in Germany). In some countries, formal rules that seek to protect sanctioned 
individuals and their families from incomes below a given subsistence level can further reduce the scope of 
benefit sanctions (e.g., Czech Republic, Norway, Poland). These latter three countries, as well as the 
Slovak Republic operate interesting variants of a limited sanctions scheme that place somewhat more 
emphasis on economic incentives than on benefit reductions (see notes to Table 6 for sources). While 
social assistance entitlements at the subsistence level in the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic are 
not subject to explicit behavioural requirements, benefit clients receive a so-called “activation allowance” 
for as long as they are registered with the PES and satisfy relevant behavioural requirements. In 2007, 
Norway has introduced a “qualification benefit” which entitles participants in one-year qualification 
programmes to higher benefit payments which can also be combined with some employment income. 
Similarly, since 2005, social assistance recipients in Poland who are considered employable in principle 
have the option of signing on to occupational reintegration programmes with a Social Integration Centre. 
While participating in these programmes, and subject to meeting relevant behavioural requirements, they 
receive an “integration allowance” on top of their social assistance payments. 
In general, information on the tightness of benefit sanction regimes is difficult to compare across 
countries based on formal rules which provide little indication of how they are applied in practice. In fact, 
several countries state that sanctions are “possible” or that the details “vary” depending on circumstances, 
region or benefit office (Austria, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, United States). Other countries 
have provided no information on sanctions. Detailed administrative statistics on benefit sanctions can 
facilitate more objective country comparisons. However, breakdowns needed for informative analyses 
(e.g., by type of infringement) are often not available, although the data situation tends to be better in 
countries where minimum-income benefits are also the main unemployment benefits (see e.g. Grubb et al., 
2009, Section 4.4). 
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Table 6.  Behavioural requirements and benefit sanctions, 2007 or as indicated 

































job search requirement yes  --  yes yes yes yes yes yes
registration with the PES yes yes  --  yes yes  --  yes --
participation in integration 
measures
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes









yes  -- --







Intensive Interviews initial interview  --   --  --
initial interview  
and  follow -ups
 -- 
initial interview  




Regular Confirmation of 
Circumstances







every 6 weeks every 4 weeks  --  every 4 weeks
varies by 
municipality
Proof of Independent Job 
Search





Definition of Suitable Job  --   --   --  yes yes  --   --  --




normally claim the non-activity-
tested Parenting Payment 
 --   --  no no yes -- --
Sanctions
  by type of infringement:
    (1) minor
    (2) moderate or repeated
    (3) major
(1) "w arning"












(2+3) yes, e.g. in 
proportion to 
number of days 
absent
(1) --
(2) 100% / 60 
days









Table 6 (continued). Behavioural requirements and benefit sanctions, 2007 or as indicated 




























job search requirement  yes  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
registration with the PES yes yes
depends on 
circumstances
yes no no yes yes
participation in integration 
measures
yes yes yes yes no yes yes no













after 6 / 12 
week s
Intensive Interviews yes initial interview










initial interview , 
and biannual 
follow -ups
Regular Confirmation of 
Circumstances








after 6 and 12 
week s
Proof of Independent Job 
Search









Definition of Suitable Job -- explicit explicit  --   --  non-explicit non-explicit explicit
Requirements extending to 
other Family Members
yes yes no -- possible yes yes yes
Sanctions
  by type of infringement:
    (1) minor
    (2) moderate or repeated
    (3) major
--
(1) 10%
(2+3) 30 to 100% / 
1.5 to 3 months
(1) 25% / up to 6 
months
(2+3) up to 100%
100% / 9 
week s
(1) warning











(1) up to 100% / 
until compliance
(2) up to 100% / 
13 weeks
(3) --
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supplement to the main 
benefit for participants 






supplement to the main 
















depends on circumstances 
(social activation can be priority)
no  --  yes
registration with the PES no no
depends on circumstances 
(social activation can be priority)
no yes yes
participation in integration 
measures




no yes  --  yes
Action Plans yes yes yes (but not not mandatory) yes yes yes
Intensive Interviews  --   -- 
yes, frequency varies by 
municipality (e.g. every 3 
months)
yes  --  every 3 months
Regular Confirmation of 
Circumstances
varies by municipality varies by municipality every three months --  --  every 3 months
Proof of Independent Job 
Search
varies by municipality -- depends on circumstances no  --   -- 
Definition of Suitable Job  --   --   --  --  --  explicit
Requirements extending to 
other Family Members
separate claims separate claims no -- yes no
Sanctions
  by type of infringement:
    (1) minor
    (2) moderate or repeated
    (3) major
(1) rare
(2+3) subject to 
income not falling 





legal requirement to consider 
effect on incomes of 
dependents.
(1) --
(2+3) 5% for each 
unjustified absence; 
100% if 3 or more 
absences / 1 month
--
(1) 100% / 4 w eeks
(2) 100% / 3 to 6 
months





Table 6 (continued). Behavioural requirements and benefit sanctions, 2007 or as indicated 






















job search requirement no yes yes yes yes yes yes
registration with the PES no yes yes
varies by canton or 
benefit office
yes yes
varies by state or 
benefit office
5
participation in integration 
measures
no yes yes yes yes yes
varies by state or 
benefit office
5
work requirement no yes yes
varies by canton or 
benefit office
yes yes








 --  yes, updated quarterly  --   -- 




initial interview , 
quarterly follow-ups
 --   -- 
Regular Confirmation of 
Circumstances
 -- 
every 1 to 4 
we ek s
every 4 weeks  --  every 2 weeks
varies by state or 
benefit office
 -- 





 --   --  every 2 weeks if requested  -- 
Definition of Suitable Job no explicit  --   --   --   --   -- 
Requirements extending to 
other Family Members
no yes  --   -- 




yes  -- 
Sanctions
  by type of infringement:
    (1) minor
    (2) moderate or repeated
    (3) major
no
(1+2) no




-- / maximum 
duration 12 months
(1) 100% / 2 weeks
(2+3) 100% / up to 
26 weeks
(1) 100% / ≥ 1-3 
months
(2) 100% / ≥ 3-6 
months
(3) 100% / ≥ 6 months
varies by state or 
benefit office
5
United States Slovak Republic
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Notes: ‘n/a’: not applicable; ‘--‘: information not received or incomplete. Information is for 2007 or as indicated in the sources.  Information relates to prime-age benefit recipients. Young 
adults often face more demanding requirements and stricter sanctions, while groups with particular work barriers (such as caring responsibilities, see Table 7 below) may be exempt 
from requirements altogether. 2.  Some information is available from fact-finding mission (see sources).  3.  Sanction rates lower for certain client groups.  4.  Information refers to 
activation allowance. No similar provisions exist for the basic benefit. 5. The Urban Institute Welfare Rules Database (http://anfdata.urban.org/wrd) presents information by state. 
Sources: OECD questionnaire on approaches to the activation of social assistance recipients. Canada: Social Assistance Statistical Report: 2005, published by the Federal-Provincial-
Territorial (FPT) Directors of Income Support (2006), available online: http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/en/cs/sp/sdc/socpol/page00.shtml. Denmark: MISSOC Tables 2007 published by the 
European Commission (2007), available online: http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_protection/missoc_tables_en.htm. Switzerland: non-binding guidelines published by the 
Swiss Conference of Institutions for Social Action; Conference Suisse des Institutions d’Action Sociale (2005): Aide sociale: concepts et normes de calcul 
(http://www.skos.ch/store/pdf_f/richtlinien/richtlinien/RL_franz_2008.pdf). Czech Republic: Kalužná (2008a). Poland: Kalužná (2009). Slovak Republic: Kalužná (2008b). Information for 
Finland and Ireland was collected by the Secretariat during fact-finding missions on active labour market policies in January 2008 and November 2007 respectively.  
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Activity requirements for lone parents 
Behavioural requirements do not apply uniformly across all groups of benefit recipients. For instance, 
lone parents are frequently excluded from certain requirements or their obligations are modified to account 
for the particular circumstances facing these families. To illustrate the enormous variation in behavioural 
requirements for lone parents across countries, Table  7 reproduces information on work requirements 
collected in the context of previous OECD work. Lone-parent benefits are generally designed to enable the 
parent to remain the principal care-giver until the youngest child reaches a certain age. During this time, 
job-search requirements may be minimal and participation in job-search assistance or other reintegration 
measures may be on a voluntary basis. Once the upper age limit is reached, lone parents may be 
automatically transferred to the main unemployment benefit (and have to comply with the requirements as 
relevant,  e.g., in Australia). Alternatively, there can be an expectation that most lone parents are in 
principle able to find work (e.g., in the Nordic countries). Belgium and Japan have no formal guidelines 
and leave decisions to case-worker discretion. Benefits paid to lone parents in Portugal and Spain are not 
subject to a work test. 
Table 7.  Work tests for lone parents, selected countries, around 2006 




Dependent on child age 
























Luxembourg (6)  
Canada
6 (0.5 - 6) 
Netherlands
7 (5) 
Czech Republic (4) 






8 (usually 0.25-1, with some exceptions) 
General note: In many countries there is a general system of assistance for all low-income individuals and families, and lone parents 
may or may not be treated differently in terms of work-related requirements than other claimants. A number of countries – Australia, 
France, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States – have special forms of income support for lone 
parents. Classification as a lone parent depends primarily upon the age of the youngest child. For example, in the United Kingdom 
when the youngest dependent child turns 16 the (former) lone parent can apply for other forms of income support (with work 
requirements, unless qualified for other benefits on grounds of disability, age, etc.). 
1.  All social assistance beneficiaries, including single mothers, are in principle required to be looking for work and to be ready to take 
up employment. However, in the case of single parents, especially those with young children, this requirement is not enforced very 
strongly. 
2.  Required to attend planning meetings and preparing a Personal Development and Employment Plan that covers goals for the 
future and steps to reach those goals. 
3. Required to attend a Work-Focused Interview with a Personal Adviser on application for Income Support and at intervals during 
receipt of it. From October 2008, lone parents with children aged 12 or over will be required to claim Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) 
rather than Income Support, and will therefore be subject to job-search requirements. 
4. Until 2006, parenting payment recipients with a youngest child aged less than 6 years had no participation requirement; those with 
a youngest child aged 6 to 12 years were required to attend an annual Personal Adviser interview; those with a youngest child aged 
13-15 years had to undertake 150 hours of approved activities each 26 weeks. From 30 June 2006, single parents still receiving the    
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parenting payment recipients when their youngest child turns seven must seek at least part-time work; lone parents with children 
aged 8 and more making a new benefit application will instead qualify for unemployment benefit (Newstart) with a similar work 
requirement.  There are some exemptions for large families and parents with a child with a disability (Media Release ‘Providing 
Parents With The Support And Assistance They Need To Work’, 8 November 2005, http://mediacentre.dewr.gov.au/mediacentre; 
"Changes to Parenting Payment from 1 July 2006", www.centrelink.gov.au/internet/internet.nsf/services/welfare_parents.htm). 
5. Social case workers’ discretion is the most important aspects in the Japanese social assistance system. There is no special 
treatment for lone parents, and in 1993 only one-sixth of working-age recipients of social assistance were lone parents (Eardley, T., J. 
Bradshaw, J. Ditch, I. Gough, and P. Whiteford (1996), Social Assistance in OECD Countries: Country Reports, Department of Social 
Security Research Report No. 47, London: HMSO). 
6. Participation requirements are as follows: Alberta from 6 months; British Columbia from 3 years; Saskatchewan 2 years; Manitoba 
6 years; New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia and Yukon, no formal requirements; Ontario, school age; Quebec 5 
years; Newfoundland and Labrador 2 years; Northwest Territories and Nunavut under 3 years, or under 6 years if 2 or more children. 
7. Under national guidelines until 2004, municipalities did not require availability for work when the youngest child was aged less than 
5. Since 2004, municipalities are free to determine work-availability requirements and some now require all lone parents to be 
available for work depending on individual circumstances. 
8. A few states have no exemption from work requirements for adult recipients who are caring for a young child, but 44 have some 
exemption. About half of these (23) exempt adult recipients with children up to age one; another 16 set the child age limit below one 
year and five set it higher. In addition, 19 states exempt parents who lack child care, 13 of them limiting this provision to cases where 
the child is aged six or younger (summary of the situation in 2005, based on www.spdp.org/tanf/work/worksumm.htm). 
Sources: as cited, and adapted from OECD (2007), Babies and Bosses - Reconciling Work and Family Life in OECD Countries 
(Volume 5), Paris. 
5.4  What works? Benefit dependency, employment, poverty 
Several OECD countries have introduced active labour market programmes for welfare benefit clients 
and tightened requirements to co-operate with work-oriented re-integration measures. Experience with this 
type of measures is however much more extensive in the case of first-tier out-of-work benefits. As a result, 
most of the available evidence on “what works” relates to unemployment benefits (Heckman et al., 1999; 
Martin and Grubb, 2001; OECD, 2005; Carcillo and Grubb, 2006; Kluve, 2006). Broadly, the key 
messages from this literature are as follows:
20 
•  Job-search assistance and job-search requirements: Most empirical studies indicate that job-
search assistance and counselling have positive employment effects at relatively low cost, 
especially when combined with job-search requirements that are backed up with moderate benefit 
sanctions. These measures work best for individuals with relatively good labour market 
prospects. There remain, however, some doubts on the effects on job quality, as measured in 
terms of earnings and job duration. 
•  Training: Training and education programmes typically represent the most sizable component of 
total expenditures on activation measures. Evidence, as well as theory, suggests opposing effects 
during and after the training programmes. During participation, less time is available for job-
search which can reduce search-intensity and job-finding rates (the lock-in effect mentioned 
before). Once training is completed, employment outcomes are however mainly positive, and 
mostly outweigh short-run losses. Outcomes differ significantly between groups, however, with 
larger employment gains found for adult women and little impact for prime-aged men. 
Individuals with relatively good labour market prospects appear to benefit significantly, whereas 
the negative lock-in effect is found to dominate for young jobseekers. The effectiveness of 
human-capital development measures also vary by type of programme, with more positive 
employment effects of on-the-job training and less favourable results in the case of classroom 
                                                      
20.  “Positive” effects here mean that those directly concerned by the measures are doing better. Studies almost 
never implement a fuller cost-benefit framework that would also account for the costs of implementing the 
respective programmes or for the consequences of higher off-flow from unemployment for existing 
workers (substitution or displacement effects). In addition, the majority of studies adopt a short-term 
perspective and therefore do not capture any longer-term impact of activation measures.  
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training. While employment effects of training measures can therefore be positive, the empirical 
evidence typically shows no or very little impact on hourly wages. 
•  Work requirements and employment programmes: Private-sector employment programmes can 
be effective at increasing employment probabilities of participants. In contrast, job-creation 
schemes in the public sector have been shown to be generally unsuccessful at integrating benefit 
recipients into the regular labour market. Such programmes might, however, still be justified on 
other grounds. They can serve as availability tests for individuals who are perceived to lack the 
motivation for job-search. Also, they might aim at promoting work habits (a form of on-the-job 
training) and social inclusion of participants, who may already have been out of work for some 
time. There is, however, little concrete evidence on the merits of public-sector employment 
programmes in terms of promoting such non-employment outcomes. 
These insights provide a useful background when considering the appropriate balance of rights and 
responsibilities for those relying on minimum-income benefits. However, the nature of their labour market 
difficulties is likely to be substantially different compared to those receiving unemployment benefits. The 
above findings, which already indicate some degree of effect heterogeneity, are therefore unlikely to apply 
equally to these different groups. In addition, most of the above results focus entirely on the effects of 
activation measures in terms of employment and beneficiary status. While these are clearly important, 
concerns about the high poverty risks facing those on benefits of last resort suggest that a broader set of 
outcome measures, including the effects of ‘activating’ policy measures on the incomes of different 
groups, is desirable. 
i) Policy  packages 
There are only a limited number of comprehensive evaluations of broader welfare-to-work packages 
targeted at recipients of social assistance and similar benefits.
21 Although income effects are of crucial 
importance when considering reforms of income safety-nets, most evaluations do not analyse effects on 
poverty rates and related indicators but are instead limited to outcomes such as recipient numbers and 
employment. The well-studied US welfare reform implemented in 1996 is one major exception and it is 
therefore useful to consider the main evaluation results in some detail.
22 For a number of reasons, the 
findings cannot be expected to apply directly in other policy settings (for instance, the US reform was 
essentially confined to lone parents). They do, however, give some indication of the trade-offs that 
characterise different policy choices. 
A number of studies in the US have paid particular attention to the effect of welfare-to-work measures 
on the number of recipients of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). Recipiency statistics are 
a very incomplete measure of ‘success’ as they say nothing about the well-being of individuals who 
successfully found employment, of those remaining on benefit or of those with neither work nor benefits. 
But lower benefit dependency does represent a positive outcome if other indicators show no deterioration 
(and if other benefits do not substitute for the one in question). 
                                                      
21.  Even in countries where evaluations of activation measures have focussed on means-tested benefits (e.g., 
New Start Allowance in Australia; Temporary Assistance for Needy Families in the United States), few or 
no such studies exist for other benefits which may still be available to those not complying with relevant 
behavioural requirements (Special Benefit in Australia; Food Stamps in the US). 
22.  The main element of this reform was replacing the Assistance for Families with Dependent Children with 
the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, which is time-limited and subject to more stringent 
behavioural requirements (in practice, time limits and eligibility conditions, as well as benefit levels, vary 
enormously across states). Midgley (2008) provides an excellent overview of the academic and political 
debate leading to this reform.    
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In any case, bringing down the number of benefit recipients has been a major objective associated 
with reforming welfare benefits in a considerable number of US states – and one which has been reinforced 
by the formula used for allocating federal TANF contributions to states, which rewards ‘caseload’ 
reductions. This objective is, for instance, reflected in the use of so-called ‘diversion payments’ (lump-sum 
payments on condition that people do not apply for the regular benefit during a specified period), as used in 
more than half of the states. There are also reports that a range of ‘hassle techniques’ may be used 
systematically in order to discourage benefit applications (Midgley, 2008). Terminating benefits and 
ending participation is in these cases likely to be the principal reason for applying strict benefit sanctions. 
In other states, sanctions are instead partial and used mainly as a motivational device in order to provide 
incentives for behaviour that is deemed beneficial or to restore compliance with relevant eligibility 
conditions. Clearly, the direct impact of such partial sanctions on recipiency numbers will be less strong. 
Most US studies suggest that, overall, the number of people receiving TANF (or its predecessor 
AFDC) declined by 60% between 1994 and the early 2000s, with about a third of this impact directly 
attributed to the introduction of ‘work-first’ measures (Besharov, 2006). However, cuts in spending on a 
particular benefit do not necessarily translate into lower overall spending. Despite a significant decline in 
TANF expenditures, per-capita spending on total means-tested support (including the Earned Income Tax 
Credit, EITC) almost doubled between 1990 and 2004, suggesting that substitution effects might be 
important and that work-support measures, such as the EITC as well as extended availability of public 
support for childcare and health insurance, are essential ingredients of packages aiming to reduce reliance 
on out-of-work benefits (Moffitt, 2008, Figure 1).
23 
There is evidence that earnings and employment of low-income lone parents (the principal target 
group of the US reform) increased as a result of stepping up welfare-to-work measures. But, 
unsurprisingly, the more rigorous eligibility requirements, and the resulting narrowing of the group entitled 
to benefits, meant that average household incomes rose by less or not at all (Cancian et al., 2003). About 
one third of women leaving TANF were not in employment (at a time when benefit time limits were not 
yet binding: Acs and Loprest, 2004). In fact, even for those finding employment, the effect on earnings was 
not much bigger than the loss in benefit incomes. For instance, in his review article, Moffit (2008: p. 24) 
notes that “if ‘making work pay’ means ensuring that earnings of a woman are greater off welfare than her 
welfare benefits on welfare, the evidence does not indicate a very strong effect of that kind, if any.” 
Importantly, several studies have shown that benefit losses were often compensated by higher earnings of 
household members other than the benefit recipient (Bavier, 2001). A point rarely mentioned in the US 
debate is that, since TANF is almost exclusively received by lone parents, these ‘other’ household 
members could be children or young adults, which can be a cause for concern. 
Another set of studies shows that incomes rose and poverty fell but mainly among those who did not 
enter welfare rather than among leavers (Grogger and Karoly, 2005). This is again indicative of an 
important role for work-support measures. Because of the way federal funding is allocated to states, some 
of the positive employment effects can be attributed to a virtuous cycle of declining beneficiary numbers, 
lower spending on out-of-work benefits, and a resulting increase in funds available for work-related 
support.
24 This has facilitated continued employment for working lone parents as well as transitions into 
                                                      
23.  Acs and Lopprest (2004) find that Food Stamps were received by up to 70% of former TANF recipient 
families and that 20% of TANF leavers were in receipt of Supplemental Security Income (a disability-
related transfer for low-income households). 
24.  The amount of baseline funding from the federal budget to states is fixed over a number of years (so-called 
‘block grants’) although actual federal contributions depend on a number of ‘success’ indicators 
(‘caseload’, share of benefit recipients in work or employment-related activities). In addition, states have a 
considerable degree of discretion over how funds are used so reduced spending on basic benefit payments 
created more room for extending other types of support, notably for childcare.  
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work. But since this mechanism is essentially pro-cyclical, and works in the opposite direction during 
extended downturns, many commentators in the US emphasise the importance of a strong economy for 
making welfare-to-work measures effective (e.g. Blank, 2003). A second main conclusion emerging from 
the US experience is that work-first measures are good at increasing employment and reducing benefit 
dependency, but do little to improve family incomes. Work-support measures, in turn, have a small effect 
on employment but are effective at boosting incomes and reducing poverty. In combination, these 
measures strengthen employment and improve the income position of those finding employment. But 
concerns remain for those who do not. 
ii)  Individual policy measures 
The US evidence demonstrates that the effectiveness of welfare-to-work policies depends on a large 
number of factors. It can therefore be difficult to draw conclusions about the effects of individual isolated 
measures. In fact, because different policy elements interact, evaluations of entire packages are arguably 
more useful. It is, however, interesting to ask whether individual measures can nevertheless be effective 
even without being necessarily embedded in a broader reform package and what design features are 
associated with positive or negative outcomes. 
Job-search requirements backed up by moderate sanctions have generally been shown to work well 
as an instrument to promote transitions from social assistance into work.
25 Measures to intensify job-search 
and develop search skills are relatively cost-effective and the ‘threat’ effects of even small sanctions appear 
to be sizable. For instance, an evaluation of introducing temporary and partial sanctions (up to 20%) in the 
Dutch city of Rotterdam resulted in a doubling of transition rates from welfare to work (van den Berg et 
al., 2004). There is also evidence that the lock-in effect is of much less relevance for those welfare 
recipients who are unlikely to succeed at finding a job on their own. In the Rotterdam study, applying 
sanctions at an earlier stage during the benefit spell was therefore associated with lower long-term 
unemployment. Mandating participation in time-intensive counselling sessions for social assistance 
recipients in Aarhus, Denmark, has lead to significant lock-in effects for those who are essentially job-
ready but not for groups facing more substantial employment barriers (Bolvig et al., 2001, cited in Ochel, 
2004). Similar results have been reported for Norway (Roed and Raaum, 2006). However, if introduced 
without intensive counselling and other job-search assistance, tightening requirements mainly increases 
employment among individuals with comparatively good labour market prospects.
26 Moreover, with overly 
demanding requirements, there is a risk that individuals with weaker job prospects would leave the benefit 
rolls without work and face much-reduced access to job-search assistance and other employment-related 
support measures. 
Small lock-in effects are also reported for employment programmes and strictly enforced work 
requirements. A study of a workfare programme recently introduced in Germany, the so-called ‘one-euro 
jobs’, finds little negative impact on transition rates into work for participants during the programme 
(Hohmeyer and Wolff, 2007). Strictly enforced work requirements and participation in employment 
programmes also do not appear to lead to lower-quality job matches. OECD (2005) reports on empirical 
studies that suggest ‘work first’ strategies may have little effect on employment stability and can even 
improve it. However, the German study suggests that the hoped-for positive longer-term impact of 
workfare measures on employment probabilities is also very limited (the ‘post-programme effect’ is 
insignificant for men and small for women). Findings in other countries are more positive and suggest that 
work requirements can be especially effective when employment is in the private sector. This has for 
                                                      
25.  Voluntary job-search assistance programmes, such as the New Deal for Lone Parents introduced in the UK 
in the late 1990s, are also effective for those who participate but take-up rates are very low. 
26.  Findings in a recent study of the introduction of a Job Search Diary in Australia are typical in this respect 
(Borland and Tseng, 2007).    
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instance been shown for the UK New Deal for Young People (Dorsett, 2001). The workfare measures 
introduced by Danish municipalities as part of the Active Social Policy programme were found to be 
particularly effective, boosting welfare-to-work transition rates by some 300% (Bolvig et al., 2003). 
One disappointing result of work-first strategies is the frequent lack of discernible positive effects on 
wage growth (e.g. Card et al., 2001). But compared with work-first strategies, human capital investment 
approaches are less effective at increasing employment in the short term. It is also not clear that they 
perform better in terms of job stability or earnings progression and they are expensive to operate. 
Employment gains are, however, possibly greater in the long term (Bloom and Michaelopoulos, 2001; 
Hotz et al., 2006). The small number of studies that do follow participants of training and education 
programmes over a longer period suggest that benefits in terms of employment or earnings take two or 
more years to emerge (Dyke et al., 2005; OECD, 2005). Whether or not training and education improves 
labour market prospects depends very much on the circumstances of the benefit recipient. Carcillo and 
Grubb (2006) cite evidence that less job-ready individuals benefit more from vocational training. Yet this 
is also the group whose employment probability increases strongly as a result of participation in workfare 
and employment programmes. On the basis of available evidence, it is therefore difficult to conclude 
whether a lack of work experience or insufficient skills are the main barrier to employment for social 
assistance clients. 
A number of US studies (such as evaluations of the Portland JOBS programme) found that the most 
successful programmes employed a mixed strategy combining a strong work focus for job-ready clients 
and targeted educational and training programmes for those with very low education levels (Blank, 2003). 
Favourable results of a combination of work-first and qualification programmes are also reported for 
Norway (Dahl and Lorentzen, 2005). As might be expected, the outcome of comparing employment effects 
between ‘work-first’ and ‘human-capital’ strategies depends strongly on the specific types of measure 
being compared. For instance, the study of the effects of the UK New Deal for Young People showed that 
subsidised private-sector employment has a much larger positive impact on employment outcomes than 
full-time training or education. But the outcomes for those in the training and education programme were 
no worse when compared with voluntary work or community service (Dorsett, 2001). 
6.  Institutional context, programme implementation and service delivery 
A stronger emphasis on labour-market re-integration makes benefits of last resort arguably more 
similar to unemployment benefits. For countries operating multiple layers of working-age benefits, the 
question then arises as to what extent employment-related services, such as job-search assistance, should 
be integrated or kept separate for recipients of the different benefits. An obvious advantage of integration is 
the economies of scale that can be reaped. Related to that, social assistance beneficiaries can benefit from 
the expertise and established contacts with employers at the main PES. At the same time, a lack of co-
ordination between the various bodies may result in duplication of effort. Also, PES staff may lack the 
expertise for assisting clients with severe employability issues. Specialised service providers may in these 
cases be in a better position to address specific employment barriers and to determine whether job-search 
activities should be suspended or accompanied by complementary reintegration measures. 
Of course, without additional resources for the PES, broadening the client group represents additional 
demands on PES staff. A diversion of resources from more employable to less employable clients can 
reduce the overall ‘success rate’, as proxied, for example, by the population of successful placements into 
jobs (Carcillo and Grubb, 2006). Yet, if the PES records a number of vacancies for low-skilled workers 
which they are unable to fill, then drawing on a larger and more diverse pool of job-seekers could also be 
an advantage. Treating social assistance beneficiaries in a similar way to other unemployed individuals 
could also increase their motivation levels and reduce stigmatisation by potential employers.  
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There is a trend in many OECD countries to provide ‘one-stop shops’ or service centres for benefit 
recipients and job seekers. The main attraction from a user’s point of view is that services are more easily 
accessible and information about them can be readily obtained when provided in one place. In addition, 
having all clients enter through a single ‘gateway’ facilitates targeting of services and interventions to suit 
the client’s needs and circumstances and can help to  break down barriers between the different institutions 
(e.g. by harmonising terminology). Due to the heterogeneity of the circumstances and needs of social 
assistance beneficiaries, the case for one-stop shops providing or arranging a broad range of different 
services and programmes is arguably particularly strong for this group. 
Yet, the provision of different services under one roof does not automatically lead to a better co-
ordination of processes and institutional objectives. With the involvement of different institutions (e.g. 
municipality, PES, social insurance institution), there is considerable scope for diverging objectives and 
misaligned incentives, regardless of the physical arrangement of the premises. For instance, municipalities 
financing social assistance expenditures may have an incentive to shift budgetary responsibility for a client 
to other programmes while the PES may have little interest in adding hard-to-place individuals to their 
client base.
27 One result can be an expensive, but ineffective, ‘cycling’ of clients through labour market 
programmes. If these issues are not addressed (e.g. by using more finely-grained output targets such as 
setting separate performance objectives for each group of PES clients), then the different parts may largely 
operate side-by-side without the synergies of a joint or fully co-ordinated operation. 
To improve coherence between different labour market programmes and support measures, some 
countries have created a separate institution charged with co-ordinating the delivery of programmes (the 
US Workforces Investment Boards are one example). Several other OECD countries, including Austria, 
Finland, France and Germany, operate multiple benefits in an often complex institutional context and have 
recently sought to improve co-ordination between the different bodies. Emerging evaluations of these 
institutional innovations (in Finland and Germany) will potentially provide valuable insights into the 
strengths and weaknesses of different approaches. 
The degree of decentralisation of benefit administration and service delivery is partly historically 
determined and sometimes subject to rigid legal constraints. It can, however, also present a tool to make 
support packages more adaptable to local labour markets and the reasons for clients’ employment 
difficulties. Many countries have recently decentralised various aspects of labour market policy (OECD, 
2003b). Essentially, decentralisation can be a strategy to improve the targeting of benefits and the rights 
and responsibilities attached to them. Decentralised service delivery can also be better tailored to local 
labour markets and policies. Compared with a highly centralised administrative structure, regional or local 
institutions are likely to be in a better position to build valuable links with local actors such as employers, 
community groups or support networks. By delegating both budgetary and operational responsibilities to 
the regional or local level, it is in principle possible to strengthen institutional incentives, resulting in a 
better correspondence between budgetary expenditures, the choice and duration of re-integration services 
offered and the success at reducing benefit dependency. 
Delivery of social assistance-related services is highly decentralised in most countries. In federally 
organised countries, political responsibility (i.e. the formulation of legal rules or guidelines) tends to lie 
with regions or municipalities as well. However, as noted, a stronger welfare-to-work focus can lead to 
                                                      
27.  For instance, the introduction of mandatory community work for social-assistance recipients in Belgium in 
the late 1980s led to a sizable reduction of exit rates from unemployment to work. One likely reason is that 
participation in the work programme allowed individuals to re-qualify for unemployment benefits. The 
welfare agency therefore had incentives to assign benefit recipients to temporary community work in order 
to shift the budgetary burden of benefit payments to the unemployment insurance institution (Cockx and 
Ridder, 2001).    
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closer links with the PES which operates in a centrally-determined policy framework and funding context 
in practically all OECD countries. It is important to recognise that different institutions and levels of 
government are likely to differ in their objectives or priorities (e.g. local development versus minimising 
labour-market inactivity rates in the country as a whole). As a result, a new institutional balance may 
implicitly alter output targets even if this is not an explicit objective of institutional changes. 
The argument for decentralisation is that it should encourage innovations in policies and lead to 
greater dissemination of good practices. But in reality it is often hard to (a) get decentralised 
administrations to invest in the necessary data collection and rigorous evaluations, and (b) to have relevant 
evaluation results readily shared with other jurisdictions.  
While the point of decentralisation is to encourage diversity of approaches, there can also be concerns 
if variations in the type and availability of financial or non-financial support become very large. For 
instance, some US commentators are concerned on equality grounds about large differences in benefit 
levels, behavioural requirements and strictness of sanctions across US states. Although the variation of 
social assistance policies operated by the nine states (Länder) in Austria is not as large as in the US, the 
Austrian federal and state governments have, for related reasons, started to work towards an agreement to 
unify payment rates and some eligibility rules. Equity concerns can also arise if decisions about client 
obligations and benefit eligibility are largely made on the basis of caseworker discretion. When faced with 
complex information and a lack of formal rules, stereotyping is one possible strategy caseworkers might 
employ in reaching entitlement decisions and assigning clients to services or programmes. This is more 
likely if the resource situation at the benefit office is such that it does not permit a comprehensive 
evaluation of clients’ circumstances, work capacity and needs. 
A fragmented institutional context, with many different actors and complex accountability lines, is 
likely to exacerbate problems of perceived inequality of service availability and quality. For instance, 
outsourcing service delivery to non-governmental providers, with their own profit or non-profit motives, 
requires the introduction and administration of entirely new quality control systems, both to secure quality 
standards and to limit the scope for unintended “creaming” or other potentially harmful profit 
maximisation strategies. Ensuring comparable performance and service standards is a particular challenge 
in such decentralised systems of service delivery. Many OECD countries have a long history of 
outsourcing training and job-creation programmes. A few countries have also started contracting placement 
services to external providers and some are outsourcing a broad range of re-integration services (notably 
Australia and the Netherlands: see OECD, 2003; Tergeist and Grubb, 2006). The United States also has 
had considerable experience with contracting a range of social services to non-governmental commercial 
and non-profit providers, including religious (or “faith-based”) organisations. Many of these organisations 
are highly respected providers of social services. There has however been a long-running debate in the US 
about the role of religious organisations who, since the “welfare reform” legislation came into effect in 
1996, are no longer required to strictly separate their social service and sectarian activities (see e.g., 
Midgley, 2008).  
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7.  Concluding comments: current and future challenges 
The current economic downturn is putting pressures on governments to strengthen income support 
measures (OECD, 2009b). While buoyant labour markets in many OECD countries have helped to restrain 
recipiency numbers since the mid-late nineties, the current rapid decline in economic activity can be 
expected to be a powerful driver of the demand for minimum safety-nets. 
In addition to the expected lengthening of average unemployment spells, and the resulting rising 
number of people running out of unemployment benefit entitlements, those with temporary jobs or other 
forms of non-standard employment are often not entitled to unemployment benefits in the first place. For 
these individuals, employment durations are shorter, transitions into and out of work more frequent and 
coverage by social insurance benefits can be less universal as a result. They are also typically more easily 
shed from the workforce. With increasing shares of non-standard workers in a number of OECD 
countries
28, this may cause social assistance benefit rolls to react more strongly to labour-market conditions 
(i.e., become more counter-cyclical) than was the case in the past. In the medium term, some of these 
challenges point to the need for a debate on the relative roles of insurance and assistance benefits. For 
instance, should coverage of insurance benefits be extended to non-standard workers or should lower-tier 
assistance benefits be strengthened? 
More urgently, there is a need to consider how an activation and reintegration focus can be maintained 
when labour demand is weak and competition for existing job vacancies intense (OECD, 2009b, c). Where 
minimum-income programmes are lower-tier benefits, recipients tend to face significantly less promising 
employment prospects in a slack labour market than recipients of unemployment benefits with more recent 
work experience. Yet, the group of minimum-income beneficiaries is very heterogeneous in most countries 
including, for instance, those with recent but intermittent employment records and other recent job losers 
who do not qualify for insurance benefits. Increasing numbers of benefit recipients are likely to test the 
capacity of welfare agencies and public employment services to administer high-quality activation 
programmes and job-search assistance to everybody. This will further add to the challenge of targeting 
activation and support measures in a way that minimises benefit spells for the most employable, while 
preventing less employable clients from becoming permanently benefit-dependent.  
The most immediate priority, however, is to prevent support seekers from going without effective 
minimum safety-nets at a time when they are most needed. Preventing steep increases in the extent and 
severity of poverty is likely to present a particularly difficult short-term challenge for those countries that 
are not currently operating broad minimum-income programmes. In addition, existing social assistance 
programmes are likely to see new clients added at much faster rates as unemployment durations lengthen. 
They will only be able to continue meeting their objectives of poverty alleviation and activation if they are 
equipped with the financial and operational capacity to deal with the inflow of new claimants and an 
increasing stock of recipients. 
                                                      
28.  Although trends are far from uniform across OECD countries, the share of temporary employment in 
EU-15 countries has increased by about 20% during the past decade (to 14.8% in 2007). Temporary work 
accounts for more than 20% of total employment in Poland and Portugal, while almost every third 
employment contract in Spain is non-permanent. Outside of Europe, Japan has seen a particularly strong 
expansion of non-standard forms of employment.    
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